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THE IMPLIED WAIVER SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF PRIVILEGE IN THE INDIVIDUAL
BANKRUPTCY CASE
Laura B. Bartell*
When a debtor voluntarily enters the realm of bankruptcy it is
commencing a civil action' seeking the adjustment of its prepetition
obligations either through liquidation of assets2 or through financial
• • 3
reorganization. As in any civil action in federal court, the Federal
Rules of Evidence are applicable to bankruptcy cases. Included
within those Federal Rules of Evidence is Rule 501, which directs
that "privilege ... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. ''
* Associate Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. This Article grew
out of my participation in the 2002 Bankruptcy Institute sponsored by the Minnesota State
Bar Association and its Bankruptcy Section. My thanks to Judge Nancy C. Dreher for turning
my thoughts to privilege in connection with that program.
Bankruptcy Form 1 is in the form of a voluntary petition for "relief in accordance with
the chapter of title 11, United States Code, specified in th[e] petition." OmICIAL BANKR.
FORM 1 (2002). The petition is filed with the clerk of the bankruptcy court, FED. R. BANKR. P.
1002(a), together with the applicable filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2000). The clerk dockets
the petition, creating a civil case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
district court. Id. § 1334(a). The case is then referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district
pursuant to standing rule of the applicable district court. Id. §157(a).
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2003). In this Article all
references to the Code refer to the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, Id. §§ 901-945, 1101-1174, 1201-
1231, 1301-1330. Editor's note: As of the publication date of thisJournal renewal of chapter
12 was still being debated in the United States Senate. This section expired on January 1,
2004.
, FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017.
5 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in full:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
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Application of privilege in bankruptcy cases has demanded a
great deal of "reason and experience." Looking in particular at the
attorney-client privilege, once the debtor is in bankruptcy the
number of variables bearing on assertion or waiver of the debtor's
privilege multiply. Allegedly privileged communications may have
taken place pre-bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. The debtor may
have filed for chapter 7 liquidation, or may be seeking adjustment
of its debts under another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. The
debtor may be an individual, or alternatively may be a legal entity,
such as a corporation or partnership, which has its own
management structure (e.g., Board of Directors, general partner,
officers), through which it has communicated with counsel both
before and after the bankruptcy petition was filed. Additionally, as a
part of the bankruptcy process, the debtor may be represented for
certain purposes by a trustee or an examiner or by the debtor in
possession, whose interests in the allegedly privileged
communications of the debtor may diverge from those of the debtor
itself or of those who own the debtor's equity or managed its affairs
before the case commenced. With all of these disparate factors
coming into play, it is not surprising that courts have struggled to
determine when the privilege applies and who has the right to assert
or waive it in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,5 the
Supreme Court concluded that in a chapter 7 case commenced'by a
corporate debtor, the trustee in bankruptcy has the power to assert
or waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to prepetition
communications between counsel for the corporation and its
management.7 Since Weintraub, courts have confidently extended its
holding to corporate chapter 11 cases,s as well as corporate cases
converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7.9 Because the Supreme
Court in Weintraub expressly stated that the rationale for its holding
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
6 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., In re Cumberland Inv. Corp., 120 B.R 627, 628 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); cf. Am.
Metrocomm Corp. v. Duane Morris & Heckscher L.L.P. (In re Am. Metrocomm Corp.), 274
B.R. 641, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that chapter 11 debtor in possession controls
attorney-client privilege with respect to prepetition and postpetition communications).
6 See In re Manshul Constr. Corp., 228 B.R. 532, 542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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was inapplicable to individual (as opposed to corporate)
bankruptcies,0 courts have divided on whether the trustee in
bankruptcy controls the privilege of an individual debtor in a
chapter 7 bankruptcy."
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court in Weintraub, as
well as all lower courts seeking to interpret its holding since that
decision, have been asking the wrong question. Instead of trying to
determine whether the trustee in bankruptcy has succeeded to the
pre-bankruptcy attorney-client privilege of the debtor in a chapter 7
case or whether the debtor still retains it, the courts should have
been asking whether anyone still had the privilege with respect to
the communications sought to be protected. The doctrine of
implied waiver of privilege, examined in the context of bankruptcy
policy, may lead to the conclusion that a debtor who voluntarily
seeks relief under the Bankruptcy Code implicitly waives his
attorney-client privilege to the extent that the allegedly privileged
communications bear on his financial condition.
Part I reviews the cases leading up to Weintraub and the analysis
of the Supreme Court in Weintraub with respect to corporate
chapter 7 bankruptcies. Part II looks at the post-Weintraub
landscape, and considers the theories that have been proposed to
justify the bankruptcy trustee's control of an individual debtor's
privilege. Part III turns to the doctrine of implied waiver of
privilege as it has been applied both outside the bankruptcy context
and in a limited way by bankruptcy courts. Part IV concludes by
asserting that the implied waiver doctrine may "solve" the problem
of determining who may assert or waive the privilege in many
individual chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, because by seeking
bankruptcy relief, the debtor implicitly waives the privilege with
respect to those confidential communications essential to resolution
10 471 U.S. at 356-57.
1 Compare McClarty v. Gudenau, 166 B.R. 101, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994), and In re
Hunt, 153 B.R. 445, 451-52 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding the trustee may not waive
privilege), with In re Foster, 217 B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997), rev'd, 188 F.3d 1259
(10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that when the estate is the owner of assets consisting of
prepetition causes of action against third parties, the trustee has right to assert or waive
privilege with respect to those causes of action), and Whyte v. Williams (In re Williams), 152
B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that the liquidating trustee who succeeded to
avoidance causes of action also succeeds to control over evidentiary privileges in connection
with those causes of action).
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of the bankruptcy case. Therefore, there is no privilege remaining
for the debtor or the trustee to assert or waive.
I. WEINTRAUB AND THE MANAGEMENT THEORY
Before the Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue, the
lower courts were divided on whether the trustee for a corporate
chapter 7 debtor had the right to waive the attorney-client privilege
with respect to prepetition communications between the
corporation's counsel and its officers and directors. The Eighth
Circuit in Citibank, N.A. v. Andros,12 in reversing a decision of the
District Court,3 concluded that the trustee in bankruptcy may waive
the privilege. 14 The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in
In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.5 under circumstances where both
directors and officers of the debtor corporation had resigned.
When an examiner was appointed with expanded powers
comparable to those exercised by a trustee, the Ninth Circuit in In re
Boileau1' concluded that the examiner had the right to waive the
privilege.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Weintraub17 distinguished O.P.M. Leasing and, expressly
rejecting the conclusion of Andros,'1 concluded that the trustee in
bankruptcy does not have the power to waive the privilege.' 9
However, even those courts that found the trustee could waive
the corporate debtor's privilege divided on the theory on which they
reached that conclusion. Some courts looked at the functions of
the trustee, analogizing them to the rights and powers exercised by
2 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
" In re Hy-Gain Elecs. Corp., 11 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1978), revd, 666 F.2d 1192
(8th Cir. 1981).
14 Andros, 666 F.2d at 1195-96.
5 670 F.2d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 1982).
16 736 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1984) (deciding a chapter 11 case).
17 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 343; see also Hudtwalker v. Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petroleum
Corp.), 40 B.R. 34, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (adopting the reasoning of Weintraub); Ross v.
Popper, 9 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he only proper person to decide whether
there should be a waiver of attorney-client privilege... is the bankrupt corporation itself, by
its authorized officer or officers."); In re Hy-Gain Elecs. Corp., 11 B.R. 119, 120 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1978) (finding that trustee may not waive privilege because privilege is not "property"
which passes to trustee).
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management of a solvent corporation which included the right to
waive the privilege (the "management theory") .2 Others saw the
attorney-client privilege of a corporation merely as one type of
property interest or asset that passes by operation of the bankruptcy
laws to the trustee upon a filing (the "property theory").21 In Andros,
the court seemed to use both theories, first noting that the power to
waive the privilege "belongs to management, not the individual
officers of the corporation, 2 2 and then adding that the "privilege
passes with the property of the corporate debtor to the trustee.
23
Other courts were equally obscure as to the theory of their
holdings. 4
The facts of Weintraub made it a favorable vehicle for Supreme
Court resolution. 5  The debtor Chicago Discount Commodity
Brokers, Inc. (CDCB) became the subject of an investigation by the
See, e.g., In re Cont'l Mortgage Investors, No. 76-593-S (D. Mass. July 31, 1979)
(authorizing waiver in an unpublished Chapter X case decided under Bankruptcy Act); In re
Blier Cedar Co., 10 B.R. 993, 997 n.5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (noting that rights and powers of
the corporation belong to the trustee); Weck v. Dist. Court, 161 Colo. 384, 388, 422 P.2d 46,
48 (1967) (allowing trustee to waive its statutory accountant-client privilege); cf In re Boileau,
736 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that examiner with expanded powers normally
carried out by trustee had power to waive attorney-client privilege).
2 See, e.g., In reO.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1981), affid
on other grounds, 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Inv. Bankers, Inc., 30 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983); In reAmjoe, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 66,131 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1976).
Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981).
Id. The Seventh Circuit in Weintraub interpreted Andros as endorsing the property
theory. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
24 See, e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs. Inc., 670 F.2d at 386 (relying on some sort of
doctrine of necessity in the absence of a board of directors); In re Nat'l Trade Corp., 28 B.R.
872, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[S]ince the Bankruptcy Act vests broad authority to manage
the affairs of corporate debtor in its trustee, the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes
with the property of the debtor's estate to the trustee."); In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Dev. of
Am., Inc., 27 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (noting the power of trustee to waive privilege "is
clear," citing Andros, 666 F.2d 1192); In re Featherworks Corp., 25 B.R. 634, 643 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 36 B.R. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding the privilege "passes by operation
of law to the trustee in bankruptcy," citing Andros, 666 F.2d 1192) (dictum); In re Smith, 24
B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (citing both the district court opinion in O.P.M. Leasing
which relied on the property theory, and Andros, which used both theories); In re
Kaleidoscope, Inc., 15 B.R. 232, 239-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R.
729 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (noting that trustee "succeeds to the rights and powers of the
Debtor with regard to the attorney/client relationship that existed between the debtor and its
pre-bankruptcy counsel.").
" All of the facts that follow come from the Brief for the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No.
84-261).
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFIC) for alleged
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 6 which eventually led to
the filing of a complaint. At the time the complaint was filed, Frank
McGhee was the sole director and officer of CDCB, as the two other
directors and officers had resigned. Frank McGhee entered into a
consent decree with the CFTC pursuant to which all assets of the
brokerage house were frozen and a receiver, John K. Notz, Jr., was
appointed for the purpose of filing a petition for liquidation under
chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
After receiver Notz filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7,
he was appointed trustee in bankruptcy for the debtor. Thereafter,
the CFTC, pursuing its formal investigation under the Commodity
Exchange Act, sought to depose Gary Weintraub, former counsel to
CDCB, with respect to suspected fraud by CDCB's officers and
employees. Weintraub answered some questions, but declined to
answer others, invoking the attorney-client privilege of the debtor.
The CFTC then asked trustee Notz to waive the debtor's attorney-
client privilege with respect to communications occurring prior to
his appointment as receiver. After the trustee purported to do so,
Weintraub was ordered to answer. Weintraub appealed, and the
district court affirmed. After Frank McGhee and one of the former
directors and officers, Andrew McGhee, intervened, the district
court modified its order, but reaffirmed that Weintraub had no
authority to assert the privilege on behalf of CDCB. The McGhee's
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and the court of appeals reversed.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the Seventh Circuit holding and the decisions by the
Second and Eighth Circuits that had allowed waiver by the trustee.
From the standpoint of those seeking reversal of the Seventh
Circuit, the case was ideal. The party-in-interest seeking to support
the trustee's right to waive the privilege was not the trustee but a
government agency charged with protecting investors, represented
by the Department of Justice. Although the trustee, John Notz,
supported the position of the government as amicus curiae, the
involvement of the Department equated the position of the
petitioner with the public interest. On the other hand, by the time
the case came before the Supreme Court, one of the respondents,
' 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
27 Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 343.
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Frank McGhee, had been convicted of embezzling customer funds
and sentenced to three years in jail,5 and the other had a substantial
civil judgment entered against him.'
The decision of the Supreme Court reversing the Seventh
Circuit was unanimous with Justice Powell not participating. While
recognizing the importance of the attorney-client privilege in
"promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients,"30 the Supreme Court noted that application of the
privilege to corporations "presents special problems.' In
particular, only living, breathing individuals can have privileged
communications with counsel on behalf of the corporation, and
only living, breathing individuals can waive the privilege with
respect to those communications. The identity of those
communicating and waiving individuals does not necessarily
coincide. In Upjohn Co. v. United States,2 the Court concluded that
communications between counsel for the corporation and lower-
level employees (not merely those who constituted the "control
group") could be protected by the privilege.3 The parties in
Weintraub agreed that the power to waive a solvent corporation's
attorney-client privilege rests exclusively with its management (i.e.,
its directors and officers). The parties also agreed that if new
management assumed control of a solvent corporation, for example
because of a takeover, the power to waive the privilege passed to the
new directors and officers. 4
Dismissing respondents' argument that the Bankruptcy Code
itself recognized the ability of debtor's management to assert the
privilege against the trustee,'35 the Court cited Butner v. United State3
6
2 Although Andrew McGhee was also a respondent, the Supreme Court quickly
concluded that, as a former director and officer, Andrew had no control over the privilege of
CDCB after his resignation and therefore that Frank McGhee was the only party who could
compete with the trustee for such control. 471 U.S. at 349 n.5.
' Brief of Respondents Frank H. McGhee and Andrew McGhee at 9 n.8, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261).
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
"1 Id.
2 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Id. at 395.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349.
Respondents argued that the language of § 542(e) of the Code supported their
argument. Id. at 351. Section 542(e) allows the court to order an attorney holding "recorded
information ... relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs, to disclose such recorded
information to the trustee," but only "[slubject to any applicable privilege." 11 U.S.C.
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20
for the proposition that waiver of privilege in a bankruptcy case
should be governed to the extent possible by the same principles
that govern waiver outside of bankruptcy. 37 Because management of
a solvent corporation concededly controlled the privilege, the Court
compared the role of the trustee in bankruptcy with that of the
officers and directors of a debtor corporation to determine which
more closely resembled that of management. Noting the broad
powers and duties conferred on the trustee by the provisions of the
Code, 39 and the effective ouster of the debtor's directors from
operation of the debtor's business," the Court concluded that "the
trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent
corporation's management."4' Finding no bankruptcy policies
would be undermined by affording the trustee the management
function of waiving the attorney-client privilege,42 the Court
concluded that the trustee of a bankrupt corporation has the power
to waive the corporation's privilege with respect to prepetition
communications with counsel.43
Although the trustee Notzj (less directly, the CFTC )45 had
argued the "property" theory to the Court to support their position
§ 542(e) (2003). The Court interpreted the "subject to" clause as "an invitation for judicial
determination of privilege questions." Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 351.
3 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
37 Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 351-52; see also William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Comment, Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1230, 1241-46 (1984).
" Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 351-52.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 721, 1106, 1108.
4 Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 353.
41 Id.
42 Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded that if debtor's directors retained the power to
assert or waive the privilege, the trustee's statutory function of investigating and pursuing
causes of action against the debtor's officers and directors could be frustrated. Id.
In response to respondents' contention that its decision would create a disincentive for
corporations to seek the protection of bankruptcy, the Court noted that "[t]he law creates
numerous incentives, both for and against the filing of bankruptcy petitions" and if its
decision created such a disincentive it was not an improper one. Id. at 357-58.
41 Id. at 358.
44 See Brief of John K. Notz, Jr., Trustee, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 6,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261)
("[T]he right to control the attorney-client privilege is an asset of the corporation, not an
asset of the particular officers or directors of the corporation. In bankruptcy the
corporation's assets are transferred to the estate, and the control of the attorney-client
privilege should belong with the Trustee as the representative of the estate.").
" The CFTC premised its argument to the Court on the "management" theory. Brief of
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that the trustee had the right to waive the privilege, the Supreme
Court never addressed it, instead grounding its holding in the
"management" theory. In rejecting respondents' argument that a
decision permitting waiver by the trustee would be applicable to
individual debtors as well as corporations, the Court expressly stated
that "our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual
bankruptcy" because "there is no 'management' that controls a
solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. If control over that
privilege passes to a trustee, it must be under some theory different
from the one that we embrace in this case.
4 7
II. POST-WENTRAUB THEORIES
The Supreme Court resolved one issue very clearly in
Weintraub-the trustee for a chapter 7 corporate debtor has the
right to waive the attorney-client privilege of the debtor with respect
to prepetition communications.4 s The Court's rationale was quickly
extended to trustees for corporate debtors in other types of
insolvency cases, such as chapter 11 trustees6 and the liquidation
trustee in a proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970.50 The "management" theory was also found applicable to
the chapter 7 trustee for a partnership debtor because a
partnership, like a corporation, can act only through agents.
51
the Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, at 8-9, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261). However, the CFTC invited the Court to apply
the "property" theory if it wished to do so. Id. at 22 n.38 ("Alternatively, the Court could
conclude that the trustee may assert or waive the attorney-client privilege because the power
to do so is an intangible asset that passes to the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code.").
4 6 Respondents essentially relegated their response to the property theory to a single
paragraph, arguing that, "[Ilike civil and constitutional rights, evidentiary privileges are
simply not property rights." Brief of Respondents Frank H. McGhee and Andrew McGhee at
20, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261).
47 Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 356-57.
48 See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Wagner, 765 F.2d 133, 134 (10th Cir. 1985); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143
F.R.D. 241, 246 n.10 (D. Colo. 1992); In re Manshul Constr. Corp., 228 B.R. 532, 542 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Madison Mgmt. Group, Inc., 212 B.R. 894, 897 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1997).
0 See, e.g., In re Cumberland Inv. Corp., 120 B.R. 627, 628 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); cf In re
Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 592 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that chapter 11 trustee succeeds to
right of corporation to raise conflict of interest claim of debtor's former counsel).
Wo See Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 434-35 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1997); cf Maleski v. Corp. Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
(holding that statutory liquidator of insurance company may waive privilege of company).
51 See United States v. Campbell, 73 F.3d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1996).
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However, in view of the Supreme Court's express statement that
its "management" theory was inapplicable to the individual (as
opposed to corporate) bankruptcy,52 lower courts and
commentators have struggled with the issue of who controls the
attorney-client privilege of an individual debtor in a chapter 7
bankruptcy after Weintraub.
53
52 Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 356-57.
51 If an individual files for protection under chapter 11 and continues to function as
debtor in possession, presumably he or she would continue to control the privilege with
respect to prepetition communications, just as management of a corporate debtor in chapter
11 controls the privilege as long as the corporation functions as debtor in possession. See, e.g.,
In reAm. Metrocomm Corp., 274 B.R. 641, 653 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); Ramette v. Bame (In re
Bame), 251 B.R. 367, 373 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000); Whyte v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R.
123, 127 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992). Although the conclusion seems self-evident, the analysis is
not. Does the individual debtor in a chapter 11 case possess the right to assert or waive the
privilege as debtor in possession because he or she has the rights and performs all functions and
duties of the trustee under § 1107(a) and the trustee would have that right, or does the
individual debtor have that right as debtor because it would never pass to the trustee (and
therefore is not included in the rights of the debtor in possession under § 107(a))?
The rationale is unimportant so long as the individual debtor acts as debtor in
possession, but becomes critical if a chapter 11 trustee is appointed or the case is converted to
chapter 7. If the chapter 11 individual debtor was exercising control over the privilege as
debtor in possession pursuant to § 1107(a), presumably the chapter 11 or chapter 7 trustee
succeeds to the same powers. The bankruptcy court so implied in Williams, where all
avoidance causes of action were transferred to a liquidating trust pursuant to the plan of
reorganization of an individual chapter 11 debtor, and the court held that the liquidating
trustee succeeded to the debtor in possession's fiduciary responsibility with respect to the
privilege. In re Williams, 152 B.R. at 129.
If, however, the individual debtor acting as debtor in possession never had the right to
assert or waive the privilege because that power remained with the individual debtor, the
result may be different. The issue is the same as that posed when the individual debtor files
under chapter 7, and therefore will be considered further in that context.
With respect to postpetition communications with counsel, an individual chapter 11
debtor may be communicating either as debtor in possession or as debtor. To the extent
communications are made in his or her capacity as debtor in possession, the right to waive the
privilege with respect to those communications should pass to a subsequently-appointed
trustee for the estate. The bankruptcy court so held in Bame. In re Bame, 251 B.R. at 374-75.
If the communication is made by the debtor qua debtor, the ability of a trustee to waive the
privilege again depends on whether a trustee ever succeeds to the individual debtor's
privilege; the timing of the privileged communications should not matter if the
communications are in fact made by the debtor in his or her individual rather than fiduciary
capacity.
The position of a chapter 13 trustee is more problematic. The chapter 13 trustee
performs all duties performed by the chapter 7 trustee specified in § 704 with the exception of
the duty to liquidate estate property and the duty to file reports and summaries of the
operation of the debtor's business. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (2003). See, e.g., Tower Loan of
Miss., Inc. v. Maddox (In reMaddox), 15 F.3d 1347, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that chapter
13 trustee has a "broad array of powers and duties" and, with respect to the obligation of
collecting and paying, "role of the chapter 13 trustee ... is virtually identical to the one played
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Some courts have simply rejected the notion that the trustee for
an individual debtor controls the privilege on any theory.54 The
policy grounds for their conclusion are the same proffered by courts
prior to Weintraub. First, they emphasize the differing expectations
of the parties; whereas corporate management would not anticipate
that it could retain control over the corporation's privilege in the
by the chapter 7 trustee. .. ."); In reColandrea, 17 B.R. 568, 581 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) ("With
the exception of the duty to reduce the estate to money, a Chapter 13 Trustee has
substantially all the duties of a Chapter 7 Trustee."). Therefore, one could argue that the
chapter 13 trustee should have the same ability to assert or waive the privilege of an individual
debtor that a chapter 7 trustee has. However, if the chapter 13 debtor is engaged in business,
11 U.S.C. § 1304(b) gives the debtor-not the trustee-the right to operate the business and
exercise the powers of the trustee under § 363(c) (transactions in the ordinary course of
business) and § 364 (obtaining credit) to the exclusion of the trustee. 11 U.S.C. 363(c), 364,
1304(b). Under the "management" theory discussed in Part II.A., such a chapter 13 debtor
might be distinguished from one not engaged in business who does not exercise
"management" functions. See infra Part II.A. In addition, the chapter 13 trustee does not take
possession of the debtor's property as does a chapter 7 trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b).
Therefore, if one were embracing the "property" theory discussed in Part II.B., arguably the
chapter 13 trustee would not succeed to the privilege of the debtor even though the chapter 7
trustee would. See infra Part II.B. There are no reported cases in which a chapter 13 trustee
sought to exercise control over the debtor's attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 592-93 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding the
chapter 11 trustee for individual debtor has no standing to raise conflict of interest claim with
respect to debtor's prepetition counsel); cf DeMassa v. MacIntyre (In re MacIntyre), 79 F.3d
1153, 1996 WL 102577, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (declining to decide the issue because
neither chapter 7 trustee nor individual debtors had purported to waive privilege); McClarty
v. Gudenau, 166 B.R. 101, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994); In re McVay, 169 B.R. 49, 51 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1994) (finding Weintraub inapposite to individual chapter 7 case where debtor was
attorney and privilege was asserted by current counsel to non-debtor clients); In re Hunt, 153
B.R. 445, 451-52 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992). See Neil E. Herman, Note, Who Controls the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Bankruptcy, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 549, 584 (1985) ("[A]ll courts should
decline the Weintraub Court's invitation to address to some theory which would divest the
individual of his attorney-client privilege" because "the chilling effect is potentially
substantial."); Julianna M. Thomas, Note, Fifteen Years After Weintraub: Who Controls the
Individual's Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy, 80 B.U. L. REv. 635, 672-80 (2000) (finding
that interests underlying attorney-client privilege and policies behind Code demonstrate need
for individual debtor to retain privilege in bankruptcy). See generally Jan L. Bansch, Note, The
Trustee's Choice? The Ability of the Trustee to Waive a Corporation's Attorney-Client Privilege in a
Corporate Bankruptcy, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 129 (1987/1988) (arguing that even a corporate debtor
should retain its privilege in bankruptcy).
The case of In re Tippy Togs of Miami, Inc., 237 B.R. 236 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999), is
sometimes cited for the proposition that the trustee can never waive the privilege on behalf of
an individual debtor. See, e.g., Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame), 251 B.R. 367, 376 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2000); French v. Miller (In re Miller), 247 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
However, the court in In re Tippy Togs of Miami, Inc. merely held that the communications at
issue were not communications of the corporate chapter 7 debtor but were instead privileged
communications of the debtor's president in his individual capacity and therefore were not
covered by the debtor's attorney-client privilege.
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event of a change in control of the corporation, an individual
expects to keep control over his privilege unless it is waived or used
in connection with a crime or fraud. Second, they express concern
that the instrumental goals of the attorney-client privilege-
encouraging "full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice"_6-would be
undermined if clients believed they would lose the protection of the
privilege if they find themselves in bankruptcy.57 Finally, these
courts place great emphasis on the privacy concerns of the
individual debtors, seeing the privilege as a personal attribute that is
not sacrificed by financial hardship.58
Those courts and commentators that have concluded that the
trustee has the power to waive an individual debtor's privilege do
not agree on a theory justifying that conclusion. This confusion
leads to a logical question: Is there a persuasive theory under which
the bankruptcy trustee has the power to waive the attorney-client
privilege of an individual debtor?
A. "Management" Theory Revisited
In endorsing the "management" theory for corporate debtors,
the Supreme Court in Weintraub compared the role of the
bankruptcy trustee to the role of corporate management outside of
bankruptcy, finding the analogy compelling. 59 The Court went on
to state that individuals have no management outside of bankruptcy
and therefore the trustee cannot succeed to management's
privileges as it can in the corporate case.60 While the observation of
the Court with respect to non-bankrupt individuals is unassailable,
its conclusion is not.
It is true that outside of bankruptcy, unless individuals are
incompetent to do so, they generally act for themselves with respect
55 See, e.g., McClarty, 166 B.R. at 102; Hunt, 153 B.R. at 452.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
5, See, e.g., Yaquinto v. Touchstone, Bernays, Johnston, Beall & Smith, L.L.P., 1999 WL
354228, at *2 (N.D. Tex.June 1, 1999); McClarty, 166 B.R. at 102; Hunt, 153 B.R. at 452.
Quoting Professor Jay Westbrook, the court in Hunt notes, "an individual does not
forfeit his soul merely because he files a bankruptcy petition." Hunt, 153 B.R. at 452 n.12; see
also McClarty, 166 B.R. at 102.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985).
Id. at 356-57.
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to assertion or waiver of the privilege. Outside of bankruptcy they
also generally act for themselves with respect to control of their
books and records, the use, sale, or lease of their property, incurring
and paying debts, bringing suit and defending against suits brought
by others, and choosing whether to disclose financial information to
third parties. Bankruptcy, however, dramatically limits an
individual's degree of autonomy over his financial affairs and
property.
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an "estate"
comprised of, among other things, "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."61 If
there is a trustee appointed, the debtor is required to surrender to
the trustee all property of the estate and any records relating
thereto. 62 Any other person holding books and records relating to
the debtor's property or financial affairs (including the debtor's
lawyer or accountant) may, after notice and a hearing, be ordered
to turn them over to the trustee.2
The individual debtor is directed to file a list of creditors and
schedules in the prescribed forms,64 file a statement of intent with
respect to consumer debts secured by property of the estate and
perform his intention within the specified time period,65 appear at
the § 341 meeting,66 and generally to "cooperate with the trustee as
necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under
this title."
67
The trustee, on the other hand, may exercise many of the rights
and powers belonging to the prepetition debtor. The trustee
becomes the legal representative of the estate.' Debts that
constitute assets of the estate must be paid to the trustee rather than
the debtor,69 and most unauthorized postpetition transfers of
property of the estate by the debtor are avoidable by the trustee.70
Only the trustee (or the debtor in possession exercising the powers
61 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1) (2003).
62 Id. § 521(4).
Id. § 542(e).
Sd..§ 521(1).
Id. § 521(2).
Id. §§ 343, 521(5).
67 Id. § 521(3).
Id. § 323(a).
Id. § 542(b).
Id. § 549 (a).
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of the trustee) is authorized to use, sell, or lease property of the
estate,7' obtain credit or incur debt that will have a claim against the
estate assets,72 or elect to assume or reject executory contracts or
leases. 73 The trustee in a chapter 7 case is directed to "collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate., 74  All trustees
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor and furnish
information about the estate to other parties in interest. 7
Except with respect to the obligation to file a statement of
intent, which is applicable only to individual debtors, the
respective rights and obligations of debtors and trustees are
identical whether the debtor entities be individual, corporate, or
legal, which prior to bankruptcy acts through "management." If the
trustee in a corporate chapter 7 bankruptcy has the power to waive
the attorney-client privilege, the trustee in an individual chapter 7
bankruptcy must also have the power. The Supreme Court's dictum
in Weintraub with respect to individual debtors is logically flawed.
The Court's emphasis on Butner required that it first identify
who exercises control over the privilege outside of bankruptcy.77 In
the case of a corporation, that was its management. In the case of
an individual, that was generally the individual. Second, the Court
looked at what actor in bankruptcy has "duties [that] most closely
resemble those of' the non-bankruptcy party controlling the
privilege. 78 Examining the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Court concluded that the trustee had "wide-ranging management
authority" over the estate and financial affairs of the corporate
debtor that was most closely analogous to the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy controller of the privilege (i.e., management). 7  The
identical provisions confer on the trustee the same authority over
the estate and financial affairs of the individual debtor; in
bankruptcy, the trustee's role is without a doubt most closely
analogous to the role of the pre-bankruptcy controller of the
71 Id. § 363.
n Id. § 364.
73 Id. § 365.
" Id. § 704(1).
Id. §§ 704(4), 704(7), 1106(a)(1).
76 Id. § 521(2).
17 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 351 (1985).
78 Id. at 351-52.
9 Id. at 352.
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privilege (i.e., the individual)."' Finally, the Court considered
whether allowing the trustee to exercise control over the privilege
"would be inconsistent with policies of the bankruptcy laws.""' The
Court found no federal (i.e., bankruptcy) policies that would be
impaired by its result, and concluded that the contrary rule would
allow debtor's management to frustrate the trustee's efforts to
uncover causes of action against officers and directors." The same
considerations would apply to the individual debtor.
The Supreme Court distinguished the individual debtor
bankruptcy case from the corporate case because the corporate
debtor "must act through agents" whereas the individual "can act for
himself."' Although that is true, it has no bearing on the analysis
the Supreme Court had just completed. The "management" theory
embraced by the Supreme Court focused not on who managed the
debtor prior to bankruptcy, but on what entity in bankruptcy
exercised analogous management functions over the estate and the
debtor's property. Whether prior to bankruptcy a debtor's affairs
are managed by a board of directors, officers, an agent, a general
partner, or by the debtor individually, the management role of the
bankruptcy trustee is the same. If one accepts the "management"
theory as iterated by the Supreme Court in Weintraub, the power of
the trustee to assert or waive the privilege should be the same as
well, despite the Court's dictum to the contrary. If that result is
socially undesirable, then perhaps the management theory is not a
satisfactory rationale for resolving the privilege issue in the
corporate context either.
The respondents made this point to the Court, apparently without effect. See Brief of
Respondents Frank H. McGhee and Andrew McGhee at 26-30, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261). Those that dispute the applicability
of the management theory to individual debtors argue that the trustee does not have control
over the postpetition activities of the individual debtor comparable to the control exercised by
the trustee over the postpetition activities of the corporate debtor. See, e.g., Mitchelson, supra
note 37, at 571 (describing that the trustee 'cannot force the debtor to work, to change jobs,
or to do anything the individual debtor does not wish to do"); Chris G. Outlaw, Note, Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege--Waiver by a Bankruptcy Trustee, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (1986) ("An
individual... can act for himself."). While this is true, control over activities other than those
relating to the property of the estate is irrelevant. And with respect to property of the estate,
complete autonomy is vested in the trustee for the individual debtor to the same extent as it is
for the corporate debtor.
" Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 356.
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B. Property Theory Revisited
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the CFTC, while arguing
primarily that a bankruptcy trustee had management authority over
the debtor corporation, also briefly suggested that the power to
assert or waive the privilege "is an intangible asset that passes to the
trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. 8 4 The Supreme Court never
addressed this theory. 5  Nevertheless, it has not been widely
adopted and no court since the Supreme Court decision in
Weintraub has concluded that the attorney-client privilege becomes
part of the estate that passes to the bankruptcy trustee for an
individual debtor pursuant to § 541 of the Code. 6
The absence of the "property" theory in post-Weintraub
decisions is surprising. Congress intended that § 541 be interpreted
very broadly.8 7  Unlike section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, " which
excluded from the estate property that was not transferable by the
debtor or subject to judicial levy,"9 § 541 has no limits on the nature
of the property included in the estate. Although § 541 does not
explicitly include "powers which the bankrupt might have exercised
for his own benefit" as did the Bankruptcy Act,0 it does include an
explicit exclusion for "any power that the debtor may exercise solely
for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor,"1 which lends
M Brief for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission at 22 n.38, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 472 U.S. 343 (1985) (No. 84-261). The same argument was
made by the bankruptcy trustee in his role as amicus curiae in the case when the petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed. See Brief ofJohn K. Notz,Jr., Trustee, as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit at 6, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343(1985) (No. 84-
261) (1984); see also supra note 21.
85 But cf Herman, supra note 54, at 571 (recognizing in the Supreme Court's reliance on
Butner v. United States-which held that property rights in bankruptcy are to be determined by
state law in the absence of an overriding federal interest-a possible acknowledgement that
the privilege is to be considered a property right).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) provides that the bankruptcy estate is comprised of, among
other things, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) (2003).
87 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868
(Section 541 "includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes
of action ... , and all other forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the
BankruptcyAct. .. ").
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, 565.
Id. at § 70(a) (5).
Id. at § 70 (a) (3).
11 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (1).
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some credence to the argument that other powers (i.e., those the
debtor exercises for his own benefit) are included in the estate.
Even if the privilege could not be characterized as "property"
itself, § 541 sweeps into the estate not only property but also the
"legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property"92 which could
be viewed as embracing the privilege to the extent it constitutes an
"interest" in other types of property. For example, property of the
estate includes any prepetition cause of action that the debtor had
against third parties. The ability of the debtor to assert or waive the
privilege with respect to that cause of action could be characterized
as an "interest of the debtor" in the property represented by that
cause of action. When the trustee (or any other person, such as an
assignee or liquidating trustee pursuant to a plan of reorganization)
becomes the holder of the cause of action, the trustee (or such
other person) also becomes the holder of the privilege insofar as
the privilege affects the pursuit of that cause of action. In other
words, the privilege runs with the underlying claim as an "interest"
in property of the debtor. This theory could be extended to any
other type of property of the debtor, allowing the holder of the
property to assert or waive the privilege with respect to
communications relating to that particular property.
An example of a case whose facts are consistent with this
analysis (although its language did not explicitly adopt it) is In re
Ingram.93  There the debtor was the defendant in a prepetition
personal injury case caused by a motor vehicle accident. Debtor was
defended by counsel provided by debtor's insurance company.
That counsel turned down a settlement offer, and debtor suffered a
large judgment against him, precipitating the bankruptcy. The
trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the insurance
company for bad faith defense of the debtor and sought counsel's
files. Under these facts, the bankruptcy court found that the
privilege belongs to the estate as repository of the claims, and the
privilege can therefore be waived by the trustee.94 Similar cases have
Id. at § 541(a) (1).
No. Civ. A. 98-05909-W, 1999 WL 33486089 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 15, 1999).
Id. at *5-6; see also In re Foster, 217 B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997), rev'd, 188
F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that when estate is owner of assets consisting of
prepetition causes of action against third parties, trustee has the right to assert or waive
privilege with respect to those causes of action); Whyte v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R.
123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (liquidating trustee who succeeded to avoidance causes of
action also succeeds to control over evidentiary privileges in connection with those causes of
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allowed tort creditors, as assignees of the rights of an insured debtor
against its insurer, to waive any privilege asserted by the insurer with
respect to communications between the lawyer representing the
insured and the insurer.95
However, the property theory remains controversial. There are
two bases for criticism. First, courts seem to find something almost
morally repugnant in the characterization of the attorney-client
privilege as some sort of "alienable commodity,"6  and
commentators uniformly agree. 7 Second, it can be argued that
even if the privilege is capable of transfer, it is a personal privilege,
connected to a person rather than to property, and its transfer
should never happen other than by consent (express or implied).
The first of these critiques seems unjustifiable. It is true that if
the privilege could not be transferred outside of bankruptcy,
consistent with the Supreme Court's touchstone of Butner,98 it
should not be transferable to the trustee in bankruptcy. Yet there is
no question that the privilege is in fact alienable both outside of
bankruptcy and in bankruptcy, either as part of a commercial
transaction or by reason of the inability of the original holder of the
privilege to exercise it. That alienability denigrates neither the
privilege nor the parties to the transaction by which it moves from
one to the other.
action); In re Smith, 24 B.R. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (finding that privileges pass by
operation of law to trustee with respect to malpractice claim against liability insurer).
See, e.g., Bourget v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29, 33 (D. Conn. 1969). These
cases can more properly be explained by the principle that one party sharing a common legal
interest in the subject matter of the confidential communication may not assert the privilege
against another. See, e.g., Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir.
1973); Perez v. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd., 2002 WL 31618812 (D.V.I. Feb. 15, 2000); Athridge v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 187 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that an insurer cannot
assert privilege against assignee of insured under common legal interest theory). Under
either theory, the courts recognize that the assignee or subrogee of the client succeeds to the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the assigned claim.
French v. Miller (In re Miller), 247 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000); see also In re
Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 590 n.15 (Bankr. D.C. Cal. 1997) (holding that the right to assert a
conflict of interest is not property of the estate "because it cannot be liquidated for the benefit
of creditors").
97 See, e.g., Bansch, supra note 54, at 136 ("It is contrary to the mandate of the
privilege ... to treat it as a chattel and pass it to those other than the client."); Mitchelson,
supra note 37, at 1238 ("[T]he right to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege is not a
right that can be bought, sold, or levied upon by creditors."); Thomas, supra note 54, at 659
("[T] he analytical validity of this argument is... implicitly disfavored.").
See at supra note 36.
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The transfer of the attorney-client privilege as part of a
consensual transfer of assets is far from uncommon, even in the
bankruptcy context. For example, in American Metrocomm Corp. v.
Duane Morris & Heckscher L.L.P.,9 the chapter 11 debtor entered
into an agreement with a subsidiary of one of its creditors pursuant
to which the debtor assigned its interest in certain litigation claims,
"together with all Shared Privileges and Privileged Materials related
thereto."00 The "Shared Privileges" and "Privileged Materials" were
expressly defined to include the attorney-client privilege relating to
the assigned claims. The agreement further provided that the
assignee was to "have the right to manage, waive, enforce or
otherwise deal with" the privilege.'1 There was no suggestion that
the agreement was ineffective because a privilege is too personal to
be an "alienable commodity."
Indeed, even in In re Hunt,0 2 the oft-cited post-Weintraub case
refusing to allow the liquidating trustees under the debtors' chapter
11 plans of reorganization to waive the individual debtors' privilege,
the court noted that "the Hunts' reorganization plans are silent as
to the transfer of privileges along with the avoidance actions,"
implying that the privilege could have been transferred by
agreement.
0 3
Outside the commercial arena, the privilege can be exercised
by those other than the original holders when the holders are
unable to exercise the privilege for themselves. For example, the
Supreme Court held in Swidler & Berlin v. United States'°4 that as a
matter of federal common law the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of its holder'0 The conclusion of the Court was
consistent with Uniform Rule of Evidence 502106 and Proposed
Am. Metrocomm Corp. v. Duane Morris & Heckscher L.L.P. (In reAm. Metrocomm
Corp.), 274 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
,o" Id. at 647.
101 Id. at 648.
153 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
SId. at 454.
524 U.S. 399 (1998).
'05 The Court's decision did not address whether there is someone after the death of a
client who controls it, or whether the privilege continues forever without a holder. See
generally Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does it Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87
KY. L.J. 1165 (1999).
10 Rule 502(c) of the Unified Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
(c) Who may claim privilege. The privilege [under this rule] may be claimed by the
client, his client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20
Federal Rule of Evidence 503, '07 both of which contemplate that the
holder of the privilege can be someone other than the individual
client if the client is under guardianship or is deceased.1"" Clearly
the privilege is not so personal and inalienable that no surrogate
can exercise it.
But even if the privilege is capable of transfer that does not
mean that the trustee should be able to exercise it merely because
the trustee possesses the property of the debtor. In the commercial
context, the transfer of the privilege is generally consensual. 109
Some courts have held that an entity that acquires all or
substantially all of the assets of an insolvent privilege holder
becomes the successor of that holder for purposes of asserting or
waiving the privilege." °
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation,
association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was
the lawyer or the lawyer's representative at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
UNIF. R. EviD. 502(c).
107 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(c) was identical to Uniform Rule of Evidence
502(c). FED. R. EVID. 503(c). Like the other proposed rules dealing with specific privileges, it
was rejected by Congress in favor of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See supra note 5.
Nevertheless, the proposed rules remain a valuable resource in discerning federal common
law on privilege. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981); In re
GrandJury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th
Cir. 1978).
IN See, e.g., Lietz v. Primock, 327 P.2d 288, 291 (Ariz. 1958) (finding that the guardian ad
litem may waive privilege with respect to the lawsuit concerning which he was appointed);
Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Del Fain. Ct. 2001) (holding that the guardian for the
elderly woman could invoke privilege on her behalf); In re Guardianship of Escola, 534 N.E.
2d 866, 871 (Ohio App. 1987) (deciding that the guardian may waive physician-client
privilege of incompetent ward); Yancy v. Erman, 99 N.E.2d 524, 531-32 (Ohio Ct. Comm. P.
1951) (holding that the guardian for incompetent defendant could waive attorney-client
privilege); Mayorga v. Tate, 752 N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 2002) (finding that assignee of
executory of deceased client's estate may waive privilege). See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 378
(2002); E. S. Stephens, Annotation, Waiver of Attorney-Client Pritilege by Personal Representative or
Heir of Deceased Client or by Guardian of Incompetent, 67 A.L.R.2d 1268 (1959).
1W See, e.g., Rhode Island Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Mapleroot Dev. Corp., 710 A2d
167 (R.I. 1998) (finding that Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corporation
could exercise privilege when it acquired substantially all assets of insolvent lender from
receiver pursuant to asset purchase agreement that explicitly provided for the transfer of all
privileges).
no See, e.g., Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Hotel of Gainesville Assoc., 988 F. Supp. 1460
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that the purchaser of all the assets of a bankrupt company acquired
debtor's attorney-client privilege); In re Fin. Corp. of Am., 119 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1990) (finding that assignees from Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation of assets of insolvent
savings and loan may assert privilege); FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 129 F.R.D. 188
(M.D. Fla. 1989) (deciding that the FDIC in its corporate capacity as assignee of failed bank's
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However, most courts reject the notion that privilege attaches
to property rather than persons,"' and conclude that the assignee of
property in a commercial context does not acquire the right to
assert or waive the privilege with respect to communications relating
to that property."2 Under this view, the transfer to the trustee of
even substantially all the property of an individual (that is, all
property not excluded from the definition of property of the estate
under § 541 of the Code) should not carry with it the debtor's
privilege, even if the privileged communications relate to the
property so transferred."'
assets acquired the right to assert privilege); In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 37 B.R. 894,
(Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (holding the assignee of all debtor's tangible and intangible assets
pursuant to reorganization plan succeeded to attorney-client privilege); Talley Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. 368, 374 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (deciding that the purchaser of all the
assets of a company controls privilege when seller subsequently dissolved). The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, acting as conservator or receiver, succeeds to the privileges of
a failed financial institution pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (2) (A) (i). See, e.g., Fin. Corp., 119
B.R. at 737. See generally 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAW §
2328, at 639 (rev. ed. 1961) ("Where the client's interest has been assigned,... the privilege is
transferred to the assignee, for the purpose of waiver, so far as the communications affect
merely the realization of the transferred interest; but it remains with the client so far as they
affect any liability or right remaining in him.").
M See, e.g., Talley Indus., Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 373 ("[T]he privilege.., was not to
protect the subject matter involved [i.e., the property or interest under discussion] . . .but,
rather, to protect the relationship of the lawyer and client to facilitate an openness of
communications.").
11 See, e.g., In re Hunt, 153 B.R. 445, 453-54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that the
transfer by debtors-in-possession of avoidance causes of action to independent trustees did not
transfer privileges); NCL Corp. v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs. (Eastern), Inc., 144 B.R. 170, 174
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the assignment of the lease did not transfer attorney-
client privilege with respect to communications between original lessee and counsel); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 and 89-4, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1990), vacated in
part on other grounds, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that transfer of assets does not effect
transfer of privilege unless control of entity also passes); FDIC v. McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662, 664
(D. Kan. 1988) (deciding that the transfer of assets does not transfer privilege); Sobol v. E. P.
Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 99, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that the purchaser of rights to
author's books did not acquire privilege with respect to communications between seller and
counsel about contacts with author); NL Indus., Inc. v. Koomey, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.
Tex. 1984) (noting that the transfer and assignment of patent does not transfer privilege with
respect to patent); cf. Celanese Corp. v. Leesona Corp. (In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity
Litig.), 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that the assignee of the patent did not become
former client of attorney for assignor); Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836
F.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (same). See generally John T. Hundley, White Knights, Pre-Nuptial
Confidences, and the Morning After: The Effect of Transaction-Related Disclosures on the Attorney-Client
and Related Puivileges, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 94-96 (1992/1993).
13 SeeMitchelson, supra note 37, at 1259.
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Bankruptcy could be analogized to a financial death, or a
judicial recognition of the debtor's incapacity to manage his
financial affairs. Nevertheless, if one is comparing bankruptcy to
the cases in which a representative may assert or waive the privilege
on behalf of another outside the commercial field, there are
distinctions that may make the bankruptcy trustee a less satisfactory
representative of the debtor for purposes of the privilege than a
personal representative of a decedent or a guardian of a minor or
incompetent. The bankruptcy trustee has no fiduciary duty to the
debtor; the trustee owes his duties to the creditors.1 4 The trustee
will not, and should not, act in the best interests of the debtor in
deciding whether to waive the privilege, but will pursue his statutory
obligations to collect property of the estate and investigate the
financial affairs of the debtor.1 5 Only when the interest of the
privilege holder is adequately protected has the law permitted the
privilege to be transferred to a representative by a holder who has
not voluntarily conferred that responsibility upon the other person.
Bankruptcy does not create sufficient protections for the privilege
holder to allow the trustee automatically to waive the privilege on
the holder's behalf.
Characterizing the privilege as property of the estate or an
interest in such property would also have some untoward
consequences. As suggested by one commentator, if the privilege is
controlled by the party with possession of property of the estate, the
privilege would be controlled by different parties depending on
which chapter of the Code governed the case. 6 In a chapter 7 case,
the trustee takes possession of property of the estate1 7 and would
presumably have the right to assert or waive the privilege. By
contrast, in a chapter 13 case, the debtor remains in possession of
all property of the estate and would retain the privilege.1 18 In a
chapter 11 case, control over the privilege could be vested in the
debtor in possession or, if one is appointed, in the trustee. If a case
is converted from one chapter to another, or a trustee is appointed
' The trustee is the "representative of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2003). In a
chapter 7 or chapter 11 case, a trustee may be elected by unsecured creditors. Id. §§ 702,
1104.
115 Id. §§ 704, 1106.
16 Herman, supra note 54, at 566.
M 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(4), 542.
118 Id. § 1306(b).
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and then terminated in a chapter 11 case, control over the privilege
could "ping-pong""9 from debtor to trustee and back again, a result
that lacks predictability and undermines confidence in the privilege.
The lack of clarity in the statutory language of § 541, the
absence of compelling analogies outside the bankruptcy context,
and the policy concerns discussed above all lead to the conclusion
that, even if the attorney-client privilege could plausibly be deemed
to be included in the estate consistent with the language of § 541,
the "property" theory is not a completely satisfactory resolution of
the issue of who controls the privilege of the individual debtor in
bankruptcy.
C. Case-by-Case Approach
Many courts have been reluctant to endorse a rule that would
either permit the trustee to waive the privilege for an individual
debtor in all cases, or that would preclude waiver by such a trustee
in all cases. Instead, these courts have endorsed an ad hoc case by
case approach, allowing waiver by the trustee only when the need of
the trustee for the communication to fulfill his fiduciary obligations
to the estate outweighs any potential harm to the debtor caused by
waiver of the privilege.
In perhaps the easiest case for the trustee, if the debtor is no
longer present to assert or waive the privilege, the trustee receives
the power by default. In In re Fairbanks,20 the individual debtor
(who had been indicted on various criminal offenses in connection
with treatment of client funds in his law practice and was forced into
bankruptcy involuntarily) disappeared shortly after the filing and
his current whereabouts were unknown. Given the "extraordinary
circumstances"'' of the absence of a client who could "act for
himsef , 2 in asserting or waiving the privilege, the court concluded
that the trustee-as the debtor's "financial 'alter ego ' 123 with a need
for the privileged records to administer the abandoned estate-
could waive the privilege.
12 4
,,9 Herman, supra note 54, at 566.
I 135 B.R. 717 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
12 Id. at 723.
In Id.
123 Id.
124 Id; see also In re Ingram, No. Civ. A. 98-05909-W, 1999 WL 33486089, at *1 (Bankr.
D.S.C. Apr. 15, 1999) (allowing trusteee to waive privilege when voluntary chapter 7 debtor
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However, when the individual debtor is actively participating in
the case and is attempting to protect privileged communications,
what factors could justify allowing the trustee to waive the privilege
over the debtor's objection? Commentators have suggested
considering such factors as whether the case is a liquidation or a
reorganization, whether the trustee is seeking the communication
to assist in maximizing estate assets or for another purpose, and
whether the communications at issue took place prepetition or
postpefifion. "
Only one factor has proven decisive in the reported decisions-
whether the court believes that the debtor would be harmed by the
disclosure. Thus, when the trustee seeks the privileged
communication in order to augment the bankruptcy estate by the
recovery of fraudulent transfers or discovery of undisclosed assets,
and the court independently concludes that the debtor would not
be harmed by disclosure, the trustee may be allowed to waive the
privilege even over the debtor's objection. 2 6  However, when
disclosure of the communication could subject the debtor to
criminal prosecution or when the trustee and the debtor have
adverse positions with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, the trustee is unlikely to be permitted to waive the
privilege.1
27
was not represented by counsel in his bankruptcy case, never asserted the privilege, and did
not make an appearance at the hearing on the trustee's motion to compel pre-petition
counsel to disclose privileged communications).
1 See Stephen F. Black, The Debtor's Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW.
879, 897-901 (1985); see also Herman, supra note 54, at 586 (arguing that the trustee's control
over privilege must be limited to prepetition communications).
126 See, e.g., Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame), 251 B.R. 367, 377-78 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000)
(distinguishing between communications bearing on recovery of assets for the estate from
third party transferees which would cause "no apparent and demonstrable harm to the
Debtor" and those that might subject debtor to criminal prosecution); Moore v. Eason (In re
Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (allowing trustee to waive privilege
with respect to communications with counsel that might bear on potential malpractice claim
against counsel when "[h]arm will not come to" debtors); Cf Anderson v. Vereen (In re
Vereen), Nos. 96-78369, 98-80262-W, 1999 WL 33485642, at *3 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 7, 1999)
(allowing trustee to waive privilege in action to recover fraudulent prepetition conveyances
without considering potential harm to debtor).
In See, e.g., Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (reversing
bankruptcy court decision allowing trustee to waive privilege and remanding for balancing of
trustee's need for disclosure against potential harm to debtor); French v. Miller (In re Miller),
247 B.R. 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that when purpose behind trustee's
purported waiver of privilege was to obtain evidence to revoke debtors' discharge, trustee may
not control privilege); In reRice, 224 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) (finding trustee could not
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Although courts and commentators like ad hoc case-by-case
balancing approaches to resolution of difficult issues because they
give discretion to judges to do what seems equitable under the
circumstances, 28 a test that turns on the court's assessment of harm
to the client if disclosure is allowed is inherently unpredictable.
Indeed, use of balancing tests in applying the privilege has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court, 12 9 most recently in
Swidler & Berlin v. United States.'3 0  Balancing tests "introduce[]
substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application."03 1 "An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all."
3 2
Such a balancing test is also unduly paternalistic. Should not
the client himself -assuming the client is physically present and
adequately informed of his rights-be able to make the judgment
whether disclosure of privileged communications causes the client
harm? No other court is allowed to second-guess a client who wishes
to assert the attorney-client privilege, whether the client has a good
reason to do so, a bad reason, or no reason at all. If the privilege is
not subject to balancing tests, either the client is entitled to assert it
or not. If not, the reason must be that the communications are not
., 133 or3th
protected by the privilege, the privilege has been waived, 34 or the
waive privilege related to a prepetition cause of action where defendant claimed some portion
of the proceeds as exempt); cf. Yaquinto v. Touchstone, Bernays, Johnston, Beall & Smith,
L.L.P., No, Civ. A. 398-CV-1671P, 1999 WL 354228, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 1999) (holding
that trustee should not be able to waive privilege when debtor was involuntarily forced into
bankruptcy by adverse party in previous civil proceeding; no discussion of potential harm to
debtor).
128 See generally Ralph McCullough, Chris Whelchel & Sharyn Epley, Trustees: The Ability to
Waive the Debtor's Attorney-Client Privilege, 106 COM. L.J. 1 (2001) (endorsing the balancing
approach).
I See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996); Upjohn v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
" 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
adopted a balancing test, allowing a posthumous exception to the privilege when there was
substantial need for the communication in connection with a particular criminal proceeding
that outweighed the potential "chilling effect" on lawyer-client communications. In re Sealed
Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
151 Swidler, 524 U.S. at 409.
12 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393; see also Thomas, supra note 54, at 667 ("[C]ase-by-case
balancing tests make predictability impossible.").
.. A communication between lawyer and client may not be protected by the privilege for
many reasons. For example, the communication may not be for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice but instead may be for business advice. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe
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crime/fraud exception applies.35 The fact that the trustee "needs"
the privileged communication should be irrelevant. The opposing
party always "needs" the privileged communication or it would not
seek its disclosure. The case-by-case approach is inherently flawed
for this reason.
III. THE IMPLIED WAIVER THEORY
The attorney-client privilege of a bankruptcy debtor has all the
scope and majesty of the attorney-client privilege of a non-debtor. It
should not be subject to waiver by the trustee at the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge. But nor should it enjoy a status of
impenetrability that is not shared by the privilege of a non-debtor.
Outside of bankruptcy, the holder of the attorney-client privilege
will be held to have waived the privilege if he or she takes certain
actions which put that privileged communication at issue in the
case. This Part looks at the implied waiver doctrine as it has been
developed outside of bankruptcy and as it has been applied to
bankruptcy cases.
A. Development of the Implied Waiver Doctrine
Generally, waivers of the attorney-client privilege must be
express to be effective. Indeed, waiver is often defined as the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." 36 However, limiting the doctrine of waiver to situations
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359-60 (D. Mass. 1950) ("Where a communication neither
invited nor expressed any legal opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving
of business advice, it is not privileged."). Alternatively, the communication may have been
made in the presence of a third party or otherwise not intended to be confidential. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 723 (9th Cir. 1984).
l. See, e.g., United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359 (noting privilege applies only if "not waived by
the client"); WIGMORE, supra note 110, § 2292 (describing that privileged communications are
protected "except the protection be waived").
- See, e.g., United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358 (finding that privilege is not applicable to
communications "for the purpose of committing a crime or tort"); see also In re Sealed Case,
754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1509-14 (1985).
' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d
107, 130 n.16 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 57 Fed. Appx. 656, 657, 2003 WL 236459,
at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2003); Strakosch v. JRD Properties, LLC, No. CV00008183S, 2003 WL
553278, at *1 (Conn. Super. Feb. 13, 2003); E.C.M. v. State, 835 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. App.
2003); People v. Davis, No. 235854, 2003 WL 356331, at *3 (Mich. App. Feb. 14, 2003); May v.
State, 62 P.3d 574, 585 (Wyo. 2003).
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in which interested parties affirmatively intend to abandon the
privilege would not only severely reduce the number of cases in
which waiver would be found, but would also allow parties to use the
privilege in ways that constitute abuse of the legal system.
The doctrine of implied or constructive waiver was developed
to minimize the opportunities for this type of gamesmanship by
construing certain actions of the holder of the privilege as
fundamentally inconsistent with continued assertion of the
privilege, even if there was no conscious determination to relinquish
it. For example, abuse has been found based on actual use of
privileged communications in an unfair way. Because one of the
requirements for privilege protection is confidentiality of the
communication,' when that confidentiality is breached, 138 courts
may find that the privilege has impliedly been waived.
The potential for abuse rests in the possibility that the holder of
the privilege who has made such a disclosure continues to assert the
privilege with respect to other non-disclosed but related
communications. Allowing the privilege to prevent discovery of
such other communications may risk presentation of an unbalanced
and misleading view of the privileged communications. For
example, the holder of the privilege may disclose part of privileged
137 See generally WIGMORE, supra note 110, at 554 (stating privileged communication must
be "made in confidence").
M Confidentiality is certainly breached by voluntary disclosure of privileged
communications. See, e.g., In revon Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987); Hollins v. Powell, 773
F.2d 191, 197 (8th Cir. 1985); Weil v. Inv./Indicators Research & Mgmt. Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24
(9th Cir. 1981); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). Most courts also find such a breach and waiver of the privilege even in the
case of involuntary or inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Int'l
Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 (E.D. Wis. 1980); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15
F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954). Courts differ on whether the waiver is limited to the
privileged communications inadvertently disclosed, or extends to other communications.
Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1980-81 Trade Cases 63,195 (D.D.C.), affd, 604 F.2d
672 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding waiver limited to disclosed documents), with Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C. 1974) (suggesting broad subject
matter waiver is appropriate based on inadvertent disclosure). See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
766 F.2d 770, 788 (3d Cir. 1985); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. 573 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1978). See generally Developments in the Law--Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1629, 1664 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (stating that implied waiver of undisclosed
communications is never appropriate in the case of inadvertent waiver). Some courts refuse
to find waiver even with respect to the disclosed communications if the disclosure was
inadvertent and reasonable precautions were taken to prevent it.
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communications in order to advance the holder's case, while
withholding other parts of the same or related privileged
communications that might support the opposing party.3 9 Courts
do not allow the holder to use the privilege as a "shield" while
simultaneously using the privileged communication as a "sword" to
affirmatively advance the holder's case. 40
But breach of confidentiality is not necessarily the same as
actual disclosure of a privileged communication. Another situation
in which courts find implied waiver is when the holder of the
privilege resists discovery of privileged communications at one stage
in the litigation while intending to rely on the same
communications at a later stage in order to establish his entitlement
to relief.14 1 If the privilege holder intends to use the privileged
communication as part of his case, the privilege holder should not
be able to deny the other party discovery of that same privileged
communication. Therefore, courts will uniformly find an implied
waiver even before the holder of the privilege introduces the
privileged communication into evidence if, in order to prevail in the
1" This principle is sometimes called the doctrine of "selective disclosure" or "partial
disclosure." See Developments, supra note 138, at 1633-35; T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L.
Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege via Issue Injection: A Callfor Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS.
J. 199, 200 (1998). The theory underlying the doctrine is one of fairness. See, e.g., United
States v. (Under Seal), No. 88-5546, 1988 WL 76110 (4th Cir. May 13, 1988); In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982); John Doe Corp. v. United States (In re John Doe
Corp.), 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's
Disposition of Wis. Steel, Nos. 81 C7076, 82 C6895, 85 C3521, 1987 WL 20408, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 20, 1987). Cases finding waiver as a result of selective disclosure are legion. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189 (LAP) 2001 WL 237377, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2001),
amended by No. M-11-189 (LAP), 2001 WL 3111 88 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2001); Bank Brussels
Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 93 Civ. 5298 (LMM) (RLE), 93 Civ. 8270
(LMM) (RLE), 94 Civ.1317 (LMM)(RLE), 93 Civ. 6876 (LMM)(RLE), 1998 WL 567862, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1998); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis.
Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of
Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177,186 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
140 See, e.g., Cox v. Adm'r United States Steel & Carnegie., 17 F.3d 1386, 1417 (11th Cir.
1994), modied 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292
(2d Cir. 1991); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987); GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v.
Syndicate 627, 809 F.2d 755, 762 (11th Cir. 1987); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., No. 93 Civ. 5298 (LMM)(RLE), 93 Civ. 6876 (LMM)(RLE), 93 Civ. 8270
(LMM)(RLE), 93 Civ. 1317 (LMM)(RLE), 1996 WL 173138, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1996);
Wardleigh v. SecondJudicial Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Nev. 1995).
141 This type of behavior is sometimes called "strategically timed disclosure," and is
disfavored because it may result in unfair surprise to the opposing party. See Developments,
supra note 138, at 1632-33.
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case, the holder must at some point do so. This approach has been
characterized as the "anticipatory waiver" theory,'42 and even courts
that are the most protective of the privilege have indicated that they
would disallow the privilege under these circumstances.'
43
Most courts interpret the implied waiver doctrine a bit more
expansively, finding waiver when the privileged communication is
put "at issue" in the case even if the holder does not intend to
introduce it into evidence.
A few courts have found an implied waiver of the privilege by
the mere assertion of a claim or counterclaim that renders the
privileged communication relevant. 44  Dubbed the "automatic
waiver" rule, 45 this approach has been rejected by most courts
because it appears to permit disclosure of privileged materials
without any showing of need for the materials by the opposing
party. Because relevance provides an easily met standard for
permissible discovery, the automatic waiver rule essentially makes
1 See id. at 1636, 1641-43.
1'4 See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir.
1994); Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 664-65 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Dixie Mill
Supply Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 168 F.R.D. 554, 559 (E.D. La. 1996); Smith v. Kavanaugh,
Pierson & Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1146 (La. 1987); cf Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 416 (D. Del. 1992); Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H.
1995); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Hydrite
Chem. Co., 582 N.W.2d 411, 419 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
The "anticipatory waiver" formulation of the implied waiver doctrine cannot operate
effectively with respect to a bankruptcy case because in such a case the "plaintiff"-debtor need
not prove the elements of any offense to "prevail." In other words, having filed the petition
and schedules, paying the filing fee and appearing for the § 341 hearing, the plaintiff has
done what is necessary to obtain a discharge. The burden shifts to the other parties in
interest-the trustee, the creditors, the U.S. Trustee-to seek the turn-over of property, to
make objections to claimed exemptions, to object to discharge of particular claims under
§ 523, to object to discharge under § 727, to challenge transactions as preferential or
fraudulent transfers, to exercise the strong-arm power. The privileged communications never
need be introduced as part of debtor's case in chief, because there is no presentation of a case
in chief. Thus, there can never be an anticipatory waiver.
,44 See, e.g., Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 477
(D. Colo. 1992); Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 25 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ghana Supply Comm'n v. New England
Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586, 593-94 (D. Mass. 1979); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195, 1200
(D.D.C. 1978); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Dickerson, 338 F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 260, 262 (W.D. Okla. 1971);
Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
to See, e.g., Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 191 F.R.D. 625, 634 (D. Kan. 2000); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1443, 1444-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd, 764 F.2d
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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the privilege inapplicable as the price for asserting a claim or
defense. While such a rule is easy to administer, it gives insufficient
weight to the policies underlying the privilege in the usual civil
146
case.
In Hearn v. Rhay,147 the court proposed a more restrictive test,
suggesting three criteria for implied waiver based on the conduct of
a privilege holder. First, the privilege holder must have taken some
affirmative act, such as filing suit, that results in assertion of the
privilege. Second, as a result of this affirmative act, the privileged
communication has been placed in issue by becoming relevant to
the action. Third, protecting the privileged communication from
disclosure would deny the opposing party information vital to the
opponent's defense. "8
Hearn was a civil rights case brought by an inmate in a
Washington state penitentiary. 14 Plaintiff alleged that his
confinement in the mental health unit of the facility violated his
right to due process and his right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 15 0 The defendants, the
superintendent of the penitentiary and the superintendent of the
mental health ward, asserted several affirmative defenses, including
the defense that they acted in good faith and were therefore not
liable for damages based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
15
Plaintiff sought discovery of documents concerning legal advice
given to the defendants by the state attorney general.' The
defendants claimed that such documents were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.' The court held that the privilege was
impliedly waived under the three-step test.14 First, the defendants
had taken the affirmative act of raising the good faith defense;
second, by that act, defendants placed at issue the legal advice they
received; and third, assertion of the privilege would deprive plaintiff
1' Two commentators have suggested that, "[c]arried to its ultimate conclusion, the
automatic waiver rule would destroy the attorney-client privilege any time a litigant asserted a
claim or defense." Bahner & Gallion, supra note 139, at 201.
147 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
W,' Id. at 581.
149 Id. at 576.
W Id. at 577.
151 Id.
, Id.
' Id.
Id. at 581.
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of information necessary to defeat the affirmative defense and to
prove the elements of his claim.
55
The court emphasized that Hearn was an unusual case in that
"the content of defendant's [sic] communications with their
attorney is inextricably merged with the elements of plaintiff's case
and defendants' affirmative defense.... [T]hey inhere in the
controversy itself, and to deny access to them would preclude the
court from a fair and just determination of the issues." 56  The
privilege should prevent disclosure if "the injury the relationship
would suffer from disclosure is greater than the benefit to be gained
thereby."
5 7
The Hearn test has been applied to find an implied waiver of
the privilege in a broad range of cases. In what could be seen as the
easiest case for waiver, courts have applied the Hearn test when the
holder of the privilege asserted as a defense his good faith reliance
on the advice of counsel.'5 8  In a similar vein, when the litigant's
claim is based in part on the activities of his counsel (as when
ineffective representation by counsel is alleged, or counsel is sued
for malpractice), application of the Hearn factors has lead to a
finding of waiver. 19 When the knowledge or state of mind or intent
or good faith of the privilege holder is an element of the holder's
claim or defense, and communications with counsel bear on that
issue, waiver may be implied.'m And in cases where plaintiff seeks on
'5' Id.
" Id. at 582.
157 Id. (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 at 527 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
'm See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc., 259
F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001); Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726 2001
WL 1818698, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais
(Suisse) SA., Nos. 93 Civ. 6876 (KMW), 94 Civ. 1317 (KMW), 1995 WL 598971, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995); Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (N.D.
Ill. 1993); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Cuervo v. Snell (In
re Snell), 232 B.R. 684, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999); Johnston v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 119 T.C. 27, 36-41 (2002).
i See, e.g.,Johnson v. Ala., 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir. 2001); Tasby v. United States,
504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A.,
210 F.R.D. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Harrelson v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 909, 915 (W.D.
Tex. 1997); Tunick v. Day, Berry & Howard, 486 A.2d 1147, 1149 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984);
Pappas v. Holloway, 787 P.2d 30, 36-37 (Wash. 1990); State v. Simpson, 548 N.W. 2d 105, 108
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
1W See, e.g., United States v. Karlic, No. 96-55413, 1997 WL 342210, at *2 (9th Cir. June
17, 1997); Cox v. Adm'r United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1419 (11th Cir. 1994),
modified, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.
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equitable grounds to avoid the statute of limitations, defendants
have successfully argued that they should get access to
communications between plaintiff and counsel bearing on plaintiff's
failure to institute the cause of action during the limitations
period.161
Although the Hearn test has been criticized for allowing
disclosure of privileged communications in too many cases, it has
become the majority approach to implied waiver. 63 But the claim of
implied waiver has not been made in many bankruptcy cases, and
even when a party successfully asserts that debtor impliedly waived
the privilege, bankruptcy courts have interpreted the doctrine very
narrowly.
B. Implied Waiver in Bankruptcy.
Very few bankruptcy cases raise the issue of implied waiver at
all. Those few cases in which implied waiver has been asserted in
bankruptcy cases fall into five general categories. In the first
category, the debtor (or a representative of the debtor) commences
an action against a creditor or other third party in order to recover
assets for the estate and the other party claims that the debtor's
1991); Sedco Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (8th Cir. 1982); Cleveland Indians
Baseball Co. v. United States, No. 96-CV-2240, 1998 WL 180623, at *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28,
1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Colo. 1991); United States
v. Exxon Corp. 94 F.R.D. 246, 249 (D.D.C. 1981); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444,
447 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
161 See, e.g., WLIG-TV, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 229, 234 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Wardleigh
v. SecondJudicial Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Nev. 1995).
62 See, e.g., supra note 145 (citing cases discussing the automatic waiver rule); see generally
Developments, supra note 138, at 1639-43. Other courts critical of Hearn have adopted a
"balancing" approach. See, e.g., Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
N.H., 838 F.2d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1988); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 847 F. Supp. 360,
363 (W.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661
F.2d 1243, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S.
1118 (1982).
65 See, e.g., Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. 111.
1997); Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Donaghy, 858 F. Supp. 391, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 171-72 (D. Colo. 1991); Western Gas Processors, Ltd. v. Enron
Gas Processing Co., 1989 WL 20529, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 1989); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); revd 764 F.2d 1517 (Fed. Cir.
1985); cf. Frontier Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 701 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
automatic waiver rule and finding no implied waiver under Hearn).
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privilege is impliedly waived. Implied waiver has been found on the
basis of debtor's selective disclosure of privileged
communications," and because the debtor put the privileged
communication at issue by the assertion of the claim.' Other
courts have found no implied waiver in the absence of affirmative
use of privileged materials by the debtor.
66
The second category is a variation on the first-again the action
is commenced on behalf of the debtor, but it is the debtor or the
debtor's representatives who claims implied waiver of privilege by
the non-debtor defendant based on the defense raised to the action.
When the defendant is not related to the debtor, the implied waiver
claim has succeeded. 67  When, however, the trustee sues the
debtor's former counsel, the privileged communications with the
debtor have been protected against an implied waiver claim.
In the third category the debtor (or a representative of the
debtor) is the defendant in an action brought by a creditor and the
creditor claims that the debtor has impliedly waived the privilege. If
the debtor affirmatively defends on the basis of reliance on advice of
See, e.g., Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co, 184 F.R.D. 49, 54-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding implied waiver based on distribution of report of internal investigation into
causes of debtors' collapse); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 249 (D. Colo. 1992) (finding
implied waiver in distribution of report of internal investigation to SEC, U.S. Attorney's office,
and others).
M See, e.g., Durkin v. Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), 179 F.R.D. 286 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (finding legal malpractice claim by trustee for post-bankruptcy litigation trust in which
trustee sought to avoid statute of limitations impliedly waived privilege with respect to
communications with debtor's former counsel bearing on knowledge of claim during
limitations period); Gordon v. Friedman's, Inc. (In re Gordon), 209 B.R. 414, 418 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1997) (seeking damages for emotional distress based on creditor's postpetition
collection threats put advice of counsel at issue).
lf See, e.g., RDM Holdings, Inc. v. Equitex, Inc. (In re RDM Sports Group, Inc.), 277 B.R.
415 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); cf. Gottlieb, 143 F.R.D. at 248 n.12 (finding record insufficient
to permit determination of whether certain documents fall within implied waiver doctrine in
litigation by trustee against former chairman of the board of corporation).
167 See, e.g., Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, No. 94 Civ. 1565(LAP), 94 Civ. 1844(LAP),
1997 WL 773716, at *2-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (finding defendant in preference action
impliedly waived privilege by raising defense of good faith setoff); In re Consol. Litig.
Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(finding defendant waived privilege by disclosing privileged documents to third parties, but
not by mere assertion that it acted reasonably).
Im See Danning v. Donovan (In re Carter), 62 B.R. 1007, 1014 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
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counsel, implied waiver has been found."9 Otherwise, the debtor
has not been found to have impliedly waived the privilege.70
The fourth category is a variation on the third-again the
action is commenced by a creditor against the debtor (or a
representative of the debtor), but the debtor claims that the plaintiff
creditor has impliedly waived the privilege. In this situation the
implied waiver claim has sometimes succeeded 7' and sometimes
failed. 1
72
Finally, implied waiver may be asserted in a bankruptcy case in
connection with a claim by one creditor against another or against a
third party in which the debtor has no role. In such cases the
nature of the litigation claims determines whether implied waiver
will be found.
17 3
For cases in the fourth and fifth categories, and those in the
second category that do not involve actions by the trustee against
debtor's former counsel, there are no bankruptcy policy
implications to the implied waiver doctrine; the party asserting the
privilege is not a debtor. Although the nature of the action by or
against such party may be unique to the bankruptcy arena, there are
no statutory provisions regulating disclosure of financial
information by that party and therefore no additional reason to find
implied waiver. However, in those cases in the first and third
t See Cuervo v. Snell (In re Snell), 232 B.R. 684, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999).
170 See DeMassa v. Maclntyre (In re Maclntyre), No. 95-55717, 1996 WL 102577, at *5-6
(9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996); Priest v. Interco Inc. (In re Interco Inc.), 137 B.R. 1008, 1010-11
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); cf In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 247 B.R. 828 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2000) (entering protective order permitting disclosure of certain privileged documents
bearing on claims against debtor without triggering waiver for non-disclosed documents).
t71 See Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 191 F.R.D. 625, 636-37 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding
creditor impliedly waived privilege by claiming negligence by chapter 11 debtor's counsel,
thereby putting proximate cause at issue).
172 See S.N. Phelps & Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K Corp.), Nos. 90-5052-PHX-GBN
to 90-5075-PHX-GBN, 1996 WL 529399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1996) (finding former
debenture holders of debtor did not waive privilege by suing reorganized debtors for
fraudulently procuring confirmation), aff'd on other grounds, 1997 WL 31197 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
1997).
113 See WAMCO, VIII, Inc. v. RTC Land Assets Trust 1995-NP2B (In re Long Point Rd.
Ltd. P'ship), Nos. 93-72769-JW, 96-8296, 1997 WL 33344311, at *3-6 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 8,
1997) (finding claim by one creditor against another, in which plaintiff's absence of
knowledge was essential to establish right to recovery, impliedly waived privilege as to facts
bearing on that knowledge); cf Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding implied waiver by plaintiffs in suit by buyers of securities in bankrupt
corporation against underwriters of securities under securities laws because plaintiffs sought
relief from statute of limitations).
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categories, and those suits in the second category that involve the
trustee and debtor's former counsel, it is the privilege of a debtor
that is at issue. In those situations, courts have failed to recognize
that the implied waiver analysis as it applies to the debtor does not
begin with the affirmative action of filing an adversary proceeding
or an affirmative defense. The implied waiver analysis must begin
with the filing of the bankruptcy case itself.
IV. THE IMPLIED WAIVER "SOLUTION"-A BANKRUPTCYAPPROACH
TO PRIVILEGE
The nature of the bankruptcy process requires a new analysis of
privilege and implied waiver, one that may resolve many of the cases
in which courts have struggled with the identity of the holder of the
privilege by demonstrating that the privilege no longer exists and
therefore cannot be asserted or waived by anyone. This Part lays out
a two-step analysis for privilege issues in bankruptcy.
First, the court should examine whether the communication
satisfies the requirements for privilege protection. As discussed
below, many communications from a debtor to counsel are not
entitled to privilege protection either because they do not involve
legal advice or because they were never intended to be confidential.
Second, the court should consider whether the debtor has impliedly
waived the privilege by commencing the bankruptcy case. This Part
will conclude that the action taken by a voluntary debtor in seeking
relief from his creditors waives the attorney-client privilege with
respect to what is necessarily "at issue" in a bankruptcy case-the
debtor's financial condition.
A. Is There a Privilege?
Analysis of the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy (as in
other contexts) should begin with the question of whether the
communication at issue is entitled to the protection of the privilege
at all. In perhaps the classic statement of the privilege, Dean
Wigmore set forth the requirements as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
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his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
Communications alleged to be protected in bankruptcy may lack
certain attributes necessary for that protection. For example, the
communications may have been made not for the purpose of
securing legal advice, but instead for obtaining business advice.
Even when such communications are made to a lawyer, they are not
entitled to the protection of the -privilege unless the lawyer is
predominantly giving legal advice. 7 5  In bankruptcy cases, the
allegedly privileged communications frequently relate to business
transactions undertaken by a debtor prior to filing. If the lawyer is
acting merely as a business executive, performing non-legal
functions, the communications are not privileged.
76
The privilege does not protect pre-existing documents that are
conveyed to counsel, even if the purpose for the transmittal is to
obtain of legal advice. 7 7 Thus, if the debtor/client transmits his
business files or notes to the lawyer in the expectation that the
lawyer will render legal advice on the basis of what he reads, the files
or notes do not thereby become privileged and must be turned over
upon request. Any other conclusion would allow clients to
immunize their personal papers from disclosure merely by making
their lawyers document custodians.
Even if legal advice has been sought from a lawyer acting as
such, the communication is not privileged if it was not "made in
confidence," meaning that it was not intended to be confidential.
04 See WIGMORE, supra note 110, § 2292 at 554.
175 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1224-25 (1lth Cir. 1987);
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Bowne of New York City,
Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding communications with
attorneys involving scheduling, timing, and supervision of printing of proxy statement and
mailing thereof did not involve legal advice and were not protected by privilege).
,76 See, e.g., Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, Nos. 94 Civ. 1565 (LAP), 94 Civ. 1844 (LAP),
1997 WL 773716, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997); In re Circle K Corp., 1997 WL 31197, at *3;
Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491, 511 (D.N.H. 1996); In re Leslie Fay
Cos. Inc. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. (In reFederated Dep't Stores, Inc.), 170 B.R. 331, 354-55 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
17 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976); United States v.
Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997). See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 89 (John
Williams Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
178 See, e.g., Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marshall v.
Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R 550, 556-57 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), modified 275 B.R. 5
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
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Lack of confidential intent is inherently subjective and therefore
difficult to prove, but voluntary recourse to bankruptcy may itself
demonstrate a lack of confidential intent even when the client
testifies that he or she intended the communication to be
confidential.
Disclosure by the debtor in bankruptcy cases is not a strategic
choice; it is a statutory imperative. To take advantage of the relief
afforded by the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must file a list of
creditors and, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a schedule of
assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
expenditures, and a statement of financial affairs. 79 The schedules
are very detailed, requiring disclosure of every type of real and
personal property in which the debtor has an interest and its value,
a complete list of creditors and a description of their claims, all
executory contracts and unexpired leases, all co-debtors, debtor's
employment, income and expenses, and various transactions that
bear on the debtor's financial affairs./'s Unlike a civil complaint,
these schedules are signed by the debtor, declaring that they are
true and correct, under penalty of perjury. 8' Absent objection to
discharge, no further evidence need be submitted by the debtor to
the court as to his entitlement to relief. As long as the debtor is an
individual, has not filed a waiver of discharge, does not have certain
motions pending, and has paid the filing fees, the court must grant
the individual debtor a discharge on expiration of the time for filing
an objection to discharge, which in a chapter 7 case is sixty days
after the first date set for the § 341 (a) meeting of creditors. 3
In most cases, the required lists and schedules are prepared by
debtor's attorney based on communications from the debtor. The
information so communicated is conveyed for one purpose only-to
enable the lawyer to prepare and file the required bankruptcy
forms. Information conveyed to counsel with the expectation that it
would be disclosed in a public filing is never intended to be
confidential and is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.'84
I I U.S.C. § 521(1) (2003); FED. R. BANIR. P. 1007(b) (1); OFFICIAL BA NKR. FORM 6.
8 OFFiCIAL BANKR. FORMs 6, 7. The schedules must be filed either with the petition or,
if the debtor files a list of creditors with the petition, may be filed within fifteen days after the
petition is filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
'm FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008.
Id. 4004(c).
Id. 4004(a).
184 The cases arise most frequently in the context of tax returns. When information is
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Communications made by a debtor to an attorney with the
expectation that their content will be disclosed in the required
bankruptcy petition and schedules are equally lacking in
confidential intent 51
Bankruptcy courts have failed to apply this principle. For
example, in In re Stoutamire86 the bankruptcy court refused to
compel debtor's counsel's legal secretary to answer questions in
court about the so-called "intake interview" conducted to elicit
information for inclusion on the bankruptcy schedules (which were,
in fact filed). While acknowledging that the information actually
disclosed on the schedules is not confidential, the court found that
the conversations may have included information not ultimately
disclosed and the interview gathering that information must
therefore be protected.'87 The court's conclusion confuses the
requirements for according privileged status to a communication in
the first instance (which includes the requirement that the
conveyed to a tax attorney for use in preparing a tax form, it is not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Federick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d
485, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 n.3 (8th Cir. 1972);
Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Schenectady Say.
Bank, 525 F. Supp. 647, 653 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp.
1048, 1057-58 (D. Md. 1971); United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490, 492-93 (N.D.N.Y
1969); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding
information given lawyer to assist in preparing prospectus which was to be published not
intended to be confidential); United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 44748 (2d Cir. 1958)
(finding advice to client about proposed bond issue was not privileged when client directed
lawyer to disclose it by letter to third persons). But see United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp.
177, 179-80 (D. Neb. 1970) (finding privilege protects communicated information that is not
actually included in tax return).
ISO See, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding clients
who allegedly conveyed documents to attorney to obtain advice whether to file for bankruptcy
protection failed to demonstrate that the information conveyed was not intended to be
transmitted to third parties). See generally Craig Peyton Gaumer, Breaking the Code of Silence
Piercing the Attorney-Client Privilege During Bankruptcy Fraud Investigations, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Mar. 1996, at 10 ("[A]ny discussions between the debtor and counsel about assets that had to
be disclosed relate to public information and cannot be characterized as confidential
deliberations."); cf. United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing debtor's
criminal conviction for making false statements and omitting assets from bankruptcy
schedules because district court allowed debtor's bankruptcy counsel to testify that he advised
debtor to disclose all property in his bankruptcy schedules and that falsifying a petition
constitutes perjury in violation of debtor's attorney-client privilege). But see Craig Peyton
Gaumer, Breaking the Code of Silence (Revisited): Conflicting Views on the Scope of the Attorey-Client
Privilege in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 17 AM. BANKR. INST.J., Sept. 1998, at 8, 34 (critiquing Bauer).
IS6 201 B.R. 592 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
187 Id. at 596.
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communicator intend that the communication be confidential) and
the requirements for waiver of the privilege once it exists. If the
debtor conveyed information to the legal secretary with a lack of
confidential intent (because the information was intended to be
made public in the bankruptcy schedules), the communication
never satisfied the requirements for privilege, and whether or not it
was disclosed in the filed schedules is irrelevant.' 88
]a Of course, to the extent that actual disclosure of privileged communications occurs,
the privilege will be waived. Bankruptcy courts have recognized that disclosure of certain
privileged communications waives the privilege with respect to other privileged
communications on the same subject matter. For example, when the debtor or a bankruptcy
trustee undertakes an internal investigation of the debtor and produces, with the assistance of
counsel, accountants, and other experts, a report containing fact-finding and analysis which is
then published or distributed, the trustee has been found to waive any privilege with respect
to the documents underlying the report. See, e.g., Granite Partners L.P v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,
184 F.R.D. 49, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 249 (D. Colo. 1992). If
privileged communications are actually disclosed during depositions of the holder of the
privilege, or by allowing third parties access to documents containing such communications,
the confidentiality necessary to continued preservation of the privilege is lost and the privilege
may be deemed waived not only as to the disclosed communications but also as to other
communications on the same subject matter when it would be unfair to permit such selective
disclosure. See, e.g., In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel,
666 F. Supp. 1148, 1153-54 (N.D. I11. 1987); In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 B.R. 993, 1000 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1981); cf. In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 247 B.R. 828 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000)
(granting motion for protective order providing that disclosure by debtor of certain privileged
documents would not waive privilege as to others because disclosure was not for tactical
advantage in litigation).
The Code itself implicitly requires some disclosures that are inherently inconsistent with
assertion of the privilege. The debtor must surrender to the trustee (if one is appointed) "all
property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records,
and papers, relating to property of the state." 11 U.S.C. § 521(4) (2003). Any other person
having possession, custody or control of property of the estate must deliver it to the trustee
unless it is of inconsequential value. Id. § 542(a). Although attorneys who hold books and
documents relating to the debtor's financial affairs are directed to turn over such papers to
the trustee "[s]ubject to any applicable privilege," id. § 542(e), there is no such qualification
on the obligation of the debtor or others to turn over the debtor's own records. See, e.g.,
Keller v. Blinder (In re Blinder, Robinson & Co.), 140 B.R. 790, 792-93 (D. Colo. 1992). The
theory underlying this turnover is that such papers constitute "part of the bankrupt estate."
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924). Even the constitutional protection against self-
incrimination cannot protect the debtor against this compulsory disclosure, because the
transfer of such papers to the trustee is "a necessary incident to the distribution of [debtor's]
property" under the bankruptcy laws. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 459 (1913); see
also Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923); In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 92, 93-94(1923); In re
Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 275-77 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993). See generally Craig Peyton Gaumer &
Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REv. 497, 520-29 (1997). But see
In re Hyde, 235 B.R. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing debtor to assert Fifth Amendment to
prevent production of books and records of his business to trustee under "act of production"
doctrine), affjd, No. 99-5060, 2000 WL 246230 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2000). If privileged
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Privilege requires confidential intent; bankruptcy requires full
disclosure. If one has the intent to make the disclosures required by
the Bankruptcy Code in connection with a voluntary bankruptcy
filing, communications made in connection with effectuating that
intent cannot be made in confidence and therefore cannot be
privileged.
B. Has the Privilege Been Waived?
The second step in any privilege analysis in bankruptcy looks to
the acts of the client and the attorney after the communication is
made. A communication that satisfies the requirements of privilege
loses that status if the privilege is waived, either explicitly or
implicitly.
Although bankruptcy courts have applied the implied waiver
doctrine to the debtor, 9 they lack vision; they fail to recognize that
the inherent nature of a bankruptcy case requires a more expansive
view of implied waiver by the debtor to avoid undermining the
purposes underlying the Code. In sum, the seemingly laudable
efforts of courts to protect the debtor's attorney-client privilege
allow abuse of the federal courts by voluntary debtors who take the
benefits afforded by the bankruptcy process while denying those
subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction the necessary tools to assert claims
and raise defenses. Assertion of the privilege by an individual
debtor who has voluntarily availed himself of the bankruptcy process
communications are disclosed in such records, the privilege is waived with respect to those
communications and all others on the same subject matter, whether those other
communications are contained in written documents that would otherwise be privileged or
whether debtor or counsel are examined with respect to those other communications.
Applying the same principles, the filing of the petition and schedules waives any
privilege with respect to those communications actually disclosed by breaching the
confidentiality required for the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430
(7th Cir. 1991); In re French, 162 B.R. 541, 548 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1994). Breach of
confidentiality is the key to implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In this regard the
attorney-client privilege must be distinguished from the protection of the Fifth Amendment,
where self-incrimination rather than mere disclosure is essential to result in an inadvertent
waiver. In Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920), the Supreme Court declined to find a
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the filing of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities in a bankruptcy case because such statement did not
constitute "an admission of guilt or furnish clear proof of crime." Id. at 72 The attorney-
client privilege is waived by mere disclosure of the communications without regard to its
nature.
'M See supra Part III.B.
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to deny the trustee or another party access to communications that
are integrally related to debtor's financial condition is inconsistent
with the nature of a bankruptcy case. This conclusion follows both
from application of the Hearn test for implied waiver and from the
application of an automatic waiver rule which, I suggest, is more
appropriate for a voluntary debtor in bankruptcy.
1. Hearn v. Rhay
Bankruptcy courts have applied the Hearn test to find implied
waiver by a bankruptcy party putting at issue the privileged
communications sought to be protected. 90 The doctrine is most
frequently invoked when the holder of the privilege asserts a
defense that is dependent on the holder's good faith'9' or when the
IN See, e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 210 F.R.D. 506, 511
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding waiver when third-party plaintiff brought claim against former lead
counsel alleging malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); IMC Chem., Inc. v. Niro, Inc., No.
Civ. A.98-2348-JIM, 2000 WL 1466495 (D. Kan. July 19, 2000) (finding waiver when plaintiff
brought suit for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement to contract, reckless
misrepresentation and professional negligence in which plaintiff alleged contract was
ambiguous); Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 191 F.R.D. 625, 637 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding waiver
when plaintiff sued debtor's counsel, alleging negligence and fraud with respect to plan of
reorganization); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 847 F. Supp. 360, 362-64 (W.D. Pa.
1994), vacated, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding waiver when insured sued insurer alleging
that insured did not intend damage for which it sought payment); Connell v. Bernstein-
Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding plaintiff waived privilege by
seeking to avoid statute of limitations by estoppel); WAMCO, VIII, Inc. v. RTC Land Assets
Trust 1995-NP2B (In re Long Point Rd. Ltd. P'ship), Nos. 93-72769-JW, 96-8296, 1997 WL
33344311, at *2-6 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 8, 1997) (finding waiver when plaintiff based certain
causes of action on its lack of knowledge); Gordon v. Friedman's Inc. (In re Gordon), 209 B.R.
414, 418 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1997) (finding debtor waived privilege by seeking damages for
emotional distress based on postpetition collection efforts by defendant creditor). But see
Frontier Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
plaintiff did not waive privilege by suing for equitable implied indemnity); Western Gas
Processors, Ltd. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., Civ. A. No. 87-A-1472, 1989 WL 20529 (D. Colo.
Mar. 6, 1989) (finding plaintiff did not waive privilege by bringing action for declaratory relief
with respect to rights under contract drafted by counsel); RDM Holdings, Inc. v. Equitex, Inc.
(In re RDM Sports Group, Inc.), 277 B.R. 415, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (finding trustee did
not waive privilege by bringing suit against law firms and attorneys alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence, among other things); S.N. Phelps & Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K
Corp.), Nos. 90-5052-PHX-GBN to 90-5075-PHX-GBN, 1996 WL 529399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May
30, 1996), aff'd on other grounds, Nos. 96 Civ. 5801 (JFK), 96 Civ. 6479 (JFK), 1997 WL 31197
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997) (finding no waiver when plaintiff debenture holders brought suit
against reorganized debtor and acquiring corporation for fraud in connection with
confirmation).
"' See, e.g., Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, 1997 WL 773716, at *2-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11,
1997) (finding defendant in preference action asserted defense of setoff, which put at issue
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holder affirmatively asserts reliance on the advice of counsel. 9 2
However, it has also been used when the nature of the action
commenced by the holder of the privilege makes the privileged
communications relevant to establishing a defense. 93
The Hearn test should also lead to the conclusion that a
voluntary bankruptcy filing impliedly waives the privilege with
respect to matters that, as the court there suggested, "inhere in the
controversy itself" in the sense that they are "inextricably merged
with the elements of plaintiff's [bankruptcy] case. ", 94  The first
prong of the Hearn test for implied waiver is that the "assertion of
the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit,
by the asserting party.' 9 5 A voluntary bankruptcy case is initiated by
a filing of a petition by the proposed debtor with the bankruptcy
court.' 96 Both the language of the Hearn test quoted above, and the
cases that follow Hearn,9 7  recognize that the voluntary
commencement of a court case can constitute the affirmative act
that satisfies the first requirement for implied waiver.
The second requirement for implied waiver under the Hearn
test is that "through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the
whether right to setoff was asserted in good faith); Quinn v. Ingram (In re Gibco, Inc.), 185
F.R.D. 296, 300-02 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding good faith defense to fraudulent conveyance
claim put privileged communications at issue).
M See, e.g., Cuervo v. Snell (In re Snell), 232 B.R. 684, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999);
Anderson v. Vereen (In re Vereen), Nos. 78369-W, 98-80262-W, 1999 WL 33485642, at *1-2
(Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 7, 1999).
193 See, e.g., Simmons Foods, Inc., 191 F.R.D. at 637 (finding assertion of claims for
negligence, detrimental reliance, and fraud put at issue communications bearing on
proximate cause); Durkin v. Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), 179 F.R.D. 286 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (holding malpractice claim against debtor's prior lawyers put at issue privileged
communications); In re Long Point Rd. Ltd. P'ship, 1997 WL 33344311, at *4-5 (finding
causes of action based on lack of knowledge of defendant's action waived privilege with
respect to communications bearing on knowledge); In re Gordon, 209 B.R. at 418 (finding suit
against creditor for intentional infliction of emotional distress by threats put at issue
knowledge of debtor about legal inefficacy of threats and waived privilege for
communications with counsel on that issue); cf Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp.
(In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.), 176 B.R. 223 (M.D. Fla. 1994); In re RDM Sports Group,
Inc., 277 B.R. 415; In re Circle K Corp., 1996 WL 529399; Priest v. Interco Inc. (In re Interco
Inc.), 137 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); Providers Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Group,
Inc. (In re Tidewater Group, Inc.), 65 B.R. 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (declining to find "at
issue" waiver).
Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 582 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
19 Id.
S11 U.S.C. § 301 (2003); OFFICIAL BANKR. FORM 1.
197 See, e.g., Western Gas Processors, Ltd. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., Civ. A. No. 87-A-
1472, 1989 WL 20529, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 1989).
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protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case." 98
When a debtor voluntarily files for bankruptcy protection, what is
"at issue" before the bankruptcy court? Although one could
interpret the phrase very broadly to encompass all matters over
which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction, 99 I believe the
jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts itself provides a logical
limitation on what should necessarily be deemed to be "at issue" in
every bankruptcy case. The Hearn v. Rhay implied waiver should be
confined to those privileged communications that are inextricably
entwined with the central functions of a bankruptcy case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1), bankruptcy judges may "hear and
determine" bankruptcy cases and "all core proceedings arising
under tide 11, or arising in a case under tide 11, referred under
subsection (a) of this section."2°° "Core proceedings" are defined in
§ 157(b) (2), and include the allowance or disallowance of claims,
orders to turn over property of the estate, objections to discharge,
matters involving the automatic stay, and other matters involving
administration of the estate.0' Although there may be bankruptcy
1 Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
1 Pursuant to § 157(a), the district courts are empowered to refer to the bankruptcy
judges "any or all cases under tide 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
Id. § 157(b) (1).
W1 Id. Section 157(b) (2) provides:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A)matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B)allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D)orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H)proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I)determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J)objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M)orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
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cases in which particular "core proceedings" are not brought, almost
all enumerated "core proceedings" are unique to the bankruptcy
forum, and collectively provide a useful definition of what a
bankruptcy case is about, that is, what is necessarily "at issue" in such
a case. If the privileged communication is relevant to one of these
core proceedings, it is necessarily placed at issue by the voluntary
commencement of a bankruptcy case and implied waiver may result.
In summary, by filing a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtor is voluntarily putting at issue the assets comprising
the bankruptcy estate, the claims against that estate, counterclaims
against those claimants, preference and fraudulent conveyance
claims, and all other matters described in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2). To
the extent that privileged communications bear on those matters
(and therefore on the debtor's entitlement to relief), the second
prong of the Heam test is satisfied.
The final requirement for implied waiver under Heam is that
"application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party
access to information vital to his defense. 20 2 The problematic aspect
of this standard has always been defining what "vital" means. If the
level of need is set too low, the critics of the Hearn test maintain that
the privilege would be waived whenever the protected
communication was relevant to the case. °3 Instead, the Hearn test
has been interpreted to require a very strong showing of need-the
party seeking disclosure must be unable to obtain the information
sought from other sources and such information must be essential
to establishing its claim or defense.0 4
(N)orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against
the estate; and
(O)other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id. § 157(b) (2).
2M2 Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). Although the language of this
prong seems to suggest that it applies only when a defendant seeks privileged
communications from a plaintiff, it has been interpreted more broadly to apply whenever
access to the information is essential to allow any party in civil litigation to establish its case.
M See, e.g., United States v. Ohio Edison Co., No. C2-99-1181, 2002 WL 1585596, at *5
(S.D. OhioJuly 11, 2002).
See, e.g., Frontier Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 701 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding relevance is insufficient; information must be available from no other source);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding matters
were "tangential to and remote from the central legal issue in the case"); Western Gas
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Application of the third prong is necessarily case-specific, but
includes both a procedural aspect and one more substantive in
nature. As a procedural matter, the rule requires a sort of
exhaustion of discovery remedies. One may not seek to obtain
privileged communications when the same information may be
obtained (albeit with more effort, expense and time) from
alternative sources. The substantive aspect of the third Hearn prong
is that the privileged communication must be "essential" to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.
Such a bifurcated analysis as a condition to discovery has other
precedents. For example, a similar approach is generally used to
ascertain whether a litigant may depose opposing counsel as part of
the discovery process. In the leading case of Shelton v. American
Motors Corp.,2 °5 the court concluded that two of the conditions that
must be satisfied before opposing counsel may be deposed are that
the party seeking discovery demonstrate that "no other means exist
to obtain the information," and "the information is crucial to the
preparation of the case. , 20 6 Bankruptcy courts are familiar with the
application of these standards.0 7
This type of standard is also commonly applied in connection
with the work product doctrine and is codified in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In connection with civil litigation in federal
courts, generally "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party ....208 However, materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial are afforded additional protection under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3);2" such materials can be
Processors, Ltd. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., Civ. A. No. 87-A-1472, 1989 WL 20529, at *5 (D.
Colo. Mar. 6, 1989) (finding defendants failed to establish that testimony of counsel was only
available means of interpreting contracts at issue).
"5 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1327; see, e.g., Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 191 F.R.D. 625, 630-31 (D. Kan.
2000) (using Shelton factors to quash subpoena directed at attorney for creditor in action
against debtor's attorneys); Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, No. 94 Civ. 1565(LAP), 94 Civ.
1844(LAP), 1997 WL 773716, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (applying Shelton to grant
protective order with respect to deposition of in-house counsel).
W7 See, e.g., Ramette v. Bame (In reBame), 251 B.R. 367, 371 n.2 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000);
Wiggins v. Peachtree Settlement Funding (In re Wiggins), No. 99-40458, 99-06212, 2000 WL
33712300, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 10, 2000); In re Muskogee Envti. Conservation Co., 221
B.R. 526, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3) reads as follows in relevant part:
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obtained "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."2 "0
The standards of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" are
very familiar to bankruptcy judges.21 Courts have equated the "at
issue" waiver requirements with those set forth in Rule 26(b) (3) 212
If the information available through the privileged communication
is not available from other sources, upon a showing that the
privileged communication is essential to the party seeking it, the
third prong of Hearn should be deemed satisfied and an implied
waiver of the privilege should be found.
Although application of Hearn v. Rhay leads to the conclusion
that a voluntary debtor impliedly waives the protection of the
privilege by commencing the bankruptcy case, at least with respect
to matters vital to the party seeking discovery, the focus of the test
on the need of the moving party for the privileged materials
invariably leads the court down the slippery slope of a case-by-case
balancing test. Such a test is not only inherently unpredictable, but
fails to give adequate weight to the bankruptcy policy of full
disclosure reflected in the Bankruptcy Code.
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) (4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
210 Id.
21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7026. See, e.g., RDM Holdings, Inc. v. Equitex, Inc. (In re RDM
Sports Group, Inc.), 277 B.R. 415,422 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); In reS3 Ltd., 252 B.R. 355, 361
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000)
2 See, e.g., Worthington v. Endee, 177 F.R.D. 113, 118 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Tribune Co.
v. Purcigliotti, No. 93 Civ. 7222 LAPTHK, 1997 WL 10924, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1997),
modified 1998 WL 175933 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1998).
[Vol. 20
2003] The Implied Waiver Solution to the Problem of Privilege 71
2. Debtor-Litigant Exception-A New Automatic Waiver
Application of an automatic waiver test would find a waiver
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a voluntary debtor with
respect to communications bearing on the debtor's financial
condition at issue in the bankruptcy case. Although the cases
developing the automatic waiver concept outside of bankruptcy do
not involve attorney-client privilege, the justification for finding
automatic waiver of a plaintiff s privilege in his choice to commence
a judicial action is equally compelling in this context. As stated in
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., "[i]t would be uneven
justice to permit plaintiffs to invoke the powers of this court for the
purpose of seeking redress and, at the same time, to permit
plaintiffs to fend off questions, the answers to which may constitute
a valid defense or materially aid the defense.213
A debtor in a bankruptcy case can be characterized as someone
who seeks judicial relief because of his impaired financial health.
The debtor seeks a remedy to his ailment in the form of a fresh
start, leaving behind the ills that have afflicted the debtor in the
past. What is "at issue" in the bankruptcy case is the debtor's
financial condition. When we look at the debtor in this light, we
can see a useful analogy to a patient who, because of his physical
condition, brings an action seeking compensation. In such actions,
the physician-patient privilege is impliedly waived because the
patient has placed his physical condition at issue. 4 The same
approach is used to find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege when a litigant puts his mental condition at issue, such as
by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity or mental defect.
2 15
2'3 22 F.R.D. 266,276 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
214 See, e.g., Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1103 (3d Cir. 1995); City & Country of San
Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (Cal. 1951); Collins v. Bair, 268 N.E.2d 95, 99-101
(Ind. 1971); McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Mo. 1968); Wargo v. Buck, 703 N.E.2d
811, 816-19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); cf FED. R. EVID. 504(d) (3) (proposed 1973) (disallowing
psychotherapist-patient privilege "as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense").
215 See, e.g., People v. Lines, 531 P.2d 793, 800 (Cal. 1975); Watson v. State, 784 N.E.2d
515, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. 1982); State v. Hancock,
Nos. CA2001-12-115, CA2001-12-116, 2003 WL 1689612, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); cf.
Neftzer v. Neftzer, 748 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that by filing for
divorce and seeking custody of the children, wife made her mental and physical condition an
element to be considered by the trial court and waived any privilege with respect to medical
records relating to physical or mental injuries bearing on custody).
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Known as the "patient-litigant exception" to privilege, it recognizes
that, as a matter of fairness, the patient should not be able to
"simultaneously inject the issue of his or her condition but withhold
information so highly relevant to the issue."21 6 Similarly, by seeking
relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor has put at issue his
financial condition. The debtor should not be able to seek redress
for that condition under the Bankruptcy Code and simultaneously
shield from discovery communications that bear on that condition.
By choosing to avail himself of the protection of the bankruptcy
laws, the debtor should be deemed to waive by implication the
attorney-client privilege to the extent the privileged
communications bear on the condition that is the crux of his suit.
The conclusion that the voluntary decision to commence a
bankruptcy case impliedly waives the privilege follows logically from
non-bankruptcy law. Yet, it is difficult to find a bankruptcy case
applying this principle. For example, in Carter v. Donovan 2 7 the co-
trustees moved to compel the production of documents and the
answers to questions from an individual debtor's counsel and
argued, among other things that by filing for chapter 11 relief the
debtor had waived the privilege.2 8 The court declined to find such
a waiver, noting that "[t]he Co-trustees have not cited any cases and
this court has not found any reported decisions holding that merely
filing a bankruptcy results in a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege . .. """
In fact, in most cases the argument of implied waiver is never
made. Perhaps counsel's reluctance stems from a concern that the
court will equate such an argument with the assertion that the
attorney-client privilege cannot exist in bankruptcy, clearly an
unpalatable proposition.
216 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.13.3
(2002).
217 62 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
"' Id. at 1009-12.
211 Id. at 1015; see also In re Muskogee Envtl. Conservation Co., 221 B.R. 526, 532 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1998) (stating creditors' argument that "without authority, that the mere filing of
bankruptcy by the Debtors somehow operates as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege").
However, in Carter, the court did suggest in dictum that had the debtor filed the required
statement of affairs (which the debtor had failed to do), debtor would have expressly waived
his privilege with respect to his relationship with his counsel. Carter, 62 B.R. at 1015. As most
voluntary debtors actually file the required schedules, implied waiver should be more
commonly found on the basis of selective disclosure. See supra note 188.
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Although such a suggestion has been made,20 more recent
cases have uniformly held that the attorney-client privilege can exist
in a bankruptcy case.22 ' However, recognizing that the privilege may
exist in a bankruptcy case (i.e., that the Bankruptcy Code does not
itself abrogate the privilege) is not inconsistent with the assertion
that it can be waived in whole or in part (either expressly or
implicitly) by the holder in bankruptcy as it can outside bankruptcy.
Failure to examine whether voluntarily choosing to make the
disclosures mandated by the Bankruptcy Code results in a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege merely because the Bankruptcy Code
itself does not eliminate the privilege is elevating the bankrupt
debtor to a position superior to that of any non-bankrupt litigant, an
approach the Supreme Court eschewed under Butner.
Perhaps the reluctance of courts to consider an implied waiver
analysis reflects a concern that recognizing an implied waiver of the
privilege upon the voluntary commencement of a bankruptcy case
would create a disincentive to the filing of a petition by individual
debtors who should avail themselves of the protections of the
Bankruptcy Code. Although this may be true, such a disincentive
pales by comparison with the other penalties imposed on a debtor
who files for bankruptcy. The chapter 7 debtor must relinquish all
of his prepetition property to the trustee, and can recover it only if
o See In re Bellis, 3 F. Cas. 132, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1869); cf. McCarthy v. Arndstein,
266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924) (rejecting argument that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is inapplicable to examination of bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining
possession of property of the estate).
V See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 340 (7th
Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M.
Leasing Serv., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Aspinwall, 2 F. Cas. 64 (S.D.N.Y.
1874); In re Krueger, 14 F. Cas. 870 (D. Mass. 1872); In re Muskogee Envtl. Conservation Co.,
221 B.R. at 532. Melvin S. Hoffman, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Proceedings Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 239-44
(1979) (arguing that there is no basis for asserting that the attorney-client privilege cannot be
asserted in a bankruptcy case). See generally Stephen F. Black, The Debtor's Attorney-Client
Privilege in Bankruptcy, 40 BUS. LAW. 879, 885-88 (1985) (analyzing the issue of the "survival" of
the privilege in bankruptcy and concluding that it should survive in all cases unless waived).
Although the recent cases are unanimous that the privilege survives the bankruptcy of
its holder, the principal case on which they rely, People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F. 652
(3d Cir. 1902), does not stand for that proposition. The privilege upheld in that case was not
the privilege of the debtor but the privilege of a third party witness/attorney with respect to
communications with his non-debtor client. Id. at 564. Subsequent decisions cite the case for
the proposition that the privilege of the debtor survives bankruptcy. See Weintraub, 722 F.2d at
340; In re O.P.M. LeasingSerus., Inc., 670 F.2d at 386.
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it is exempt,222 if the trustee abandons it, 223 or if the debtor can
redeem it224 or reaffirm the debt secured by it.225 The chapter 13
debtor may keep his property, but at the price of dedicating all his
disposable income for a period of three to five years to payment of
his debts.2 26 The potential loss of the privilege can hardly compare
to the loss of property or income most debtors experience as the
price for bankruptcy relief.
Implied waiver provides a conceptually satisfactory rationale for
a perceived trend in the case law: courts have been far less likely to
conclude that the trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to the right to
assert or waive the privilege of a debtor when the debtor's entry into
bankruptcy was involuntary. Although courts have declined to allow
the trustee to waive an individual debtor's privilege even when the
debtor voluntarily initiates the bankruptcy case,227 when the filing is
involuntary the debtor's privilege is generally protected. s
Almost all cases in which courts have deprived involuntary
individual debtors of their privilege have unique facts. For example,
in In re Fairbanks 29 the involuntary bankruptcy debtor had
disappeared and could not assert or waive the privilege on his own
behalf.230 Therefore, the court allotted the privilege to the trustee.
2 31
The involuntary individual debtors in In re Blier Cedar Co.
23 2
I I U.S.C. § 522(d) (2003).
Id. § 554.
I Id. § 722.
Id. § 524(c).
2' Id. §§ 1322(d), 1325.
M See, e.g., McClarty v. Gudenau, 166 B.R. 101, 102 (E.D. Mich. 1994); In re Rice, 224
B.R. 464, 471 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998); In reJaeger, 213 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997); In re
Hunt, 153 B.R. 445, 450-51 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992); cf MacIntyre v. DeMassa (In re
Maclntyre), No. 95-55617, 1996 WL 102577, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (declining to
decide issue because no proof offered that either debtors or trustee had waived privilege);
Hudtwalker v. Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 40 B.R. 34, 39-49
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (refraining from deciding issue because trustee did not claim right to
waive individual debtors' privilege).
See, e.g., Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999); Yaquinto v.
Touchstone, Bernays, Johnston, Beall & Smith, L.L.P., No. Civ. A. 398-CV-1671P, 1999 WL
354228, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 1999); In re Butcher, 38 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1984); In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Devs of Am., Inc., 27 B.R. 28, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982);
cf In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 506 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).
M 135 B.R. 717 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
2W Id. at 720.
231 Id. at 722.
232 10 B.R. 993 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
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apparently would have been found to control the privilege (unlike
the corporation they owned, whose privilege was held to have passed
to the trustee 2 3 3 ), but the court concluded that they had no privilege
both because of the crime/fraud exception 234 and because the
communications were not intended to be confidential. The
involuntary chapter 7 case filed against the individual debtor in In re
235Bam e was voluntarily converted to a chapter 1 1 case before it was
involuntarily converted back to chapter 7.236 The allegedly
privileged communications took place during the time the debtor
was in the voluntary chapter 11. 237  Also, in In re Ingram2 38 the
bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to waive the privilege of an
involuntary pro se debtor who did not object to the waiver or
interpose any other assertion of privilege in the case, and who could
not be harmed by the disclosure.239
The leading cases allowing the trustee for an individual debtor
to control the privilege are all voluntary bankrupt 240to ontol ii l  tar kruptcies. While
none of those cases explicitly relies on the concept of implied
waiver, the equitable principles underlying the waiver doctrine-the
idea that one should not be able to use a legal proceeding to one's
benefit without making the disclosures necessary to its judicious
resolution-may explain the disparate treatment of voluntary and
involuntary cases even under existing theories of privilege in
bankruptcy.
41
Id. at 997 n.5.
2 Id. at 999, 1000-01. The privilege is generally inapplicable when the allegedly
privileged communication was made in furtherance of an ongoing crime or fraud. See, e.g.,
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 Fl. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally Martin I.
Klein & Sarah C. Lichtenstein, Trustee or Debtor: Who May Assert the Attorney-Client Privilege in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J. 35 (1985).
.. 251 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 373-74.
2M 1999 WL 33486089 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 15, 1999).
2 Id. at *5.
M4 See, e.g., Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998);
Whyte v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Smith, 24
B.R. 3, 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
241 See Hoffman, supra note 219, at 237 n.24 (1979) ("[T]he argument in favor of limiting
the right of an 'alleged' bankrupt to assert the attorney-client privilege is less compelling than
it is with regard to an adjudicated voluntary bankruptcy.").
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3. Conclusion
One who is embroiled in a bankruptcy case without his consent
should not relinquish those rights and privileges he maintains
outside of bankruptcy. To strip such an involuntary debtor of the
protection of the privilege would be inconsistent with the notion
that waiver requires some affirmative act on the holder's part that
justifies the loss of the protection. However, there is no
constitutional right to a discharge in bankruptcy. 4 2 When a debtor
chooses to seek the benefits afforded by the bankruptcy system by
making a voluntary filing, the debtor should not at the same time be
able to prevent discovery of communications the revelation of which
bear on the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the
action so commenced. 43  The automatic waiver rule-or more
precisely, a new debtor-litigant implied waiver-would deny a
voluntary debtor the protection of the attorney-client privilege with
respect to communications relevant to his financial condition at
issue in the case.
By filing for bankruptcy, a debtor is invoking the powers of the
court to discharge the debtor from his debts and provide a fresh
start in his financial life. Those powers should not be exercised on
behalf of one who makes selective disclosure of privileged
communications, or who refuses to provide that information which
is vital to those whose claims will be discharged, or to the trustee
representing those creditors, in ascertaining whether debtor is
entitled to that relief. In summary, bankruptcy mandates debtor
bare his financial soul as the price of admission; when a debtor
chooses to buy a ticket, he cannot complain about the dress code.
.' See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973); Stewart v. United States Tr. (In
re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 812 (10th Cir. 1999); Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pa. (In re
Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d
123, 127 (6th Cir. 1989).
243 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Ross (In re Ross), Nos. 97-19956DWS, 98-0246, 1999 WL 10019,
at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 1999) ("[T]he price of the fresh start is full disclosure"); In re
Jeffrey, 176 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("A Chapter 7 case involves a quid pro quo. debtors
receive a discharge and, in exchange, make full disclosure about their financial affairs. .... ");
see generally Gaumer & Nail, supra note 188, at 526 ("A debtor who files a voluntary bankruptcy
assumes the responsibility of producing records that relate to her prepetition financial
affairs.").
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